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Queering the Dream—The Impact Trump’s
Decision has on LGBTQ+ Dreamers
Candelario Saldana *
On June 15, 2012, President Obama created the Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program, which was an
exercise of prosecutorial discretion that provided temporary relief
from deportation to youth known as Dreamers. On September 5,
2017, the Trump administration announced that it would begin
phasing out the program. The fate of the program has recently
been litigated in courts including the Supreme Court, with a
decision pending from the Supreme Court anytime in 2020
(although there is a push to stall a decision due to the COVID-19
pandemic). In this article I discuss the historical context of DACA
and its creation, as well as its current state. Then I analyze the
country conditions of the top eight home countries of DACA
recipients (Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, the
Philippines, Colombia and the Dominican Republic), which
allows me to demonstrate the risk that LGBTQ+ individuals face
if they are deported back to their home countries. Finally, I give a
detailed explanation of the forms of relief available if someone
were to fall out of DACA status. I compare the experiences of
LGBTQ+ individuals to their heterosexual counterparts to
demonstrate the unique experiences that LGBTQ+ DACA
recipients face. If LGBTQ+ DACA recipients are deported back
to their home countries where few protections are in place, or if
in place lack enforcement, they will face discrimination, beatings
For 27 years of my life I was undocumented. I also benefitted from DACA at one point
in my life. I dedicate this note to my mother, Irma Briceno, who sacrificed everything to
give me a better future. Throughout my life I had people that helped me continue to reach
for my goals. Without the financial help of David Ibarra, I would not be where I am. A
special thank you to Rebecca Sharpless, Professor of Law and Director of the Immigration
Clinic at the University of Miami School of Law. Her supervision, not only in writing this
note but throughout my two years in the Immigration Clinic at Miami Law, allowed me to
grow and to continue fighting for immigrant rights. Always remember that you can put
your dreams on pause, so long as you do not stop dreaming.
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and possible exile. Furthermore, asking LGBTQ+ individuals to
simply hide their identity and return to the “closet” also has its
own psychological consequences often leading to suicide. The
impact that Trump’s decision has on LGBTQ+ Dreamers is dire,
and I hope this article sheds a light on why we must queer the
dream.
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INTRODUCTION

“Appealing to his most xenophobic base, Trump is risking
the lives of 800,000 young people, including more than
75,000 LGBTQ people who deserve to live and work free
of fear. It’s cruel and cowardly—and fits with a pattern of
implementing racist, xenophobic and anti-LGBTQ
polices that target core American values and move our
country backward.” 1
Imagine arriving in the United States as a young child, as little as one
or two years of age, and growing up believing that you were just like
everyone else. When you discuss your dreams about going away to college
with your parents, you find out that even though you acted “American”
and did everything you could to excel, you lack a Social Security number
and are not legally living in the United States. Despite these hurdles, you
continue “to pull yourself up by the bootstraps.” Unwilling to give up, you
find out that you can still attend college because the state you live in has a
state law that allows undocumented youth to attend a higher education
institution and pay in-state-tuition. 2 You graduate with honors from an
undergraduate university, and because you qualified for a program that
deferred your deportation and authorized you to legally work in the U.S.,
you find a job in your field of study. Because you felt safe, you came out
of the closet and embraced your LGBTQ identity. 3 Then after five years
Aisha C. Moodie-Mills, Statement: Trump “Cruel and Cowardly” for Ending DACA
Program, VICTORY INST. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://victoryinstitute.org/news/statementtrump-cruel-cowardly-ending-daca-program/.
2
See Gilberto Mendoza, Tuition Benefits for Immigrants, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (July 15,2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/tuition-benefitsfor-immigrants.aspx (explaining that twenty states offer in-state tuition to unauthorized
immigrant students, sixteen by state legislative action and four by state university systems.
The states that passed laws through their legislative system include: California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Washington. What these states did was enact
laws that would allow undocumented students to pay in-state tuition.); see also Utah Code
Ann. 1953 § 53B-8-106 (in 2002, Utah’s Governor signed H.B. 144 that “modifie[d] the
State System of Higher Education code to allow a student who meets certain requirements
to be exempt from paying nonresident tuition at institutions of higher education.”); see also
Tanya Golash-Boza & Benigno Merlin, Here’s how undocumented students are able to
enroll at American universities, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 24, 2016, 3:13 PM),
http://theconversation.com/heres-how-undocumented-students-are-able-to-enroll-at-amer
ican-universities-69269.
3
Although this makes a reference to an “out” LGBTQI person, this note does not solely
focus on individuals who have decided to openly live as LGBTQI. In fact, I recognize that
even in America many individuals are still afraid of coming out, and instead choose to live
closeted lives, or come out to only a few people.
1
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of having temporary relief from deportation, you are told that you are now
at risk of losing your work permit and protected status, and might be in
danger of being detained and deported because the government has all
your information.
Unfortunately, this story is the reality for thousands of LGBTQ+
identified undocumented individuals. On September 5, 2017, Attorney
General Sessions announced the Trump administration’s decision to
rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.4
DACA had allowed immigration officials to exercise prosecutorial
discretion, “providing temporary relief from deportation (deferred action)
and work authorization to certain young undocumented immigrants
brought to the United States as children.” 5
Being deported to a country you have never visited and where you
have very few, if any, memories is frightening. For DACA recipients who
identify as LGBTQ+, the specter of deportation is “even more chilling.” 6
Although the United States does not have a perfect record for LGBTQI+ 7
rights, the protections afforded are more robust than in many other
countries. 8 “In 72 countries, same-sex sexual relations are criminalized; in
45 of those countries, the laws against same-sex sexual relations apply to
both men and women. For some LGBTQ people, deportation means ‘a
death sentence.’” 9 Although there are several forms of relief including
asylum, withholding, the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and
cancellation of removal, this note will analyze the difficulties in attaining
these forms of relief. It will also look at how an LGBTQ+ identity makes
Attorney General Sessions, Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks on DACA:
Remarks as prepared for delivery, DOJ (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa
/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-daca.
5
The Dream Act, DACA, and Other Policies Designed to Protect Dreamer, AM.
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/
research/dream-act-daca-and-other-policies-designed-protect-dreamers.
6
Trudy Ring, LGBT Groups Denounce Plan to End DACA, ADVOCATE (Sept. 5, 2017,
1:38 PM), https://www.advocate.com/politics/2017/9/05/lgbt-groups-denounce-plan-enddaca.
7
In this note I will use the term LGBTQI, LGBT, LGB, LGBTQ+ to represent people
expressing a different sexual orientation than that of heterosexual. Because statistics do not
always account for all the minority sexual orientations it is difficult to always be inclusive
of all people. This note also does not fully explore the effects that Trump’s decision will
have on individuals that do not conform to what society has deemed as “normal” gender
identities. For gender non-conforming and gender non-binary individuals the effects might
be very similar to those faced by individuals belonging to sexual orientation minorities.
8
See Kimberly D. Topel, “So, what should I ask him to prove that he’s gay?”: How
sincerity, and not stereotype, should dictate the outcome of an LGB asylum claim in the
United States, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2357, 2358 (July 2017).
9
Corinne Segal, LGBTQ “dreamers” are particularly vulnerable as DACA winds
down. Here’s why.”, PBS (Sept. 8, 2017, 11:57 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/
nation/lgbtq-dreamers-particularly-vulnerable-daca-winds-heres.
4
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it harder to attain these forms of relief compared to heterosexual DACA
recipients, even though LGBTQ+ identified DACA recipients are at a
greater risk if deported. Following this introduction, Part II discusses the
historical context of DACA and how it was created. Part III analyzes
country conditions for the top eight home countries of DACA recipients
to demonstrate how LGBTQ+ people are at greater risk than their
heterosexual counterparts if deported. Part IV gives a detailed explanation
of the forms of relief available to those who have “fallen out” of DACA
status, assuming Congress has failed to act and the individual is put in
removal proceedings. Part V concludes with final thoughts.

II.
A.

A BRIEF HISTORY: FROM BEGINNING TO PHASE OUT
The Dream Act

In 2001, during the 107th Congress, Senator Orrin Hatch first
introduced the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act
or the DREAM Act. 10 The Act would amend “the Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 to repeal the denial of an
unlawful alien’s eligibility for higher education benefits.”11 The Dream
Act as first introduced would also allow undocumented youth to adjust to
permanent resident status if the person: (1) was at least 12 years of age
prior to the act being enacted; (2) filed an application before reaching 21
years of age; (3) earned a high school diploma or its equivalent; (4) was
physically present in the United States for a at least five years before the
date that the act was enacted; (5) demonstrated good moral character; and
(6) was not inadmissible or deportable under specified criminal and
security grounds according the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).12
Despite bipartisan support, the bill did not become law. 13 Over the last
eighteen years, different versions of the Dream Act have been
introduced. 14 However, none of the bills has ever reached the President’s
desk for signature to become the law of the United States. 15
10
Dream Act, S.1291, 107th Cong. (2001), https://www.congress.gov/bill/107thcongress/senate-bill/1291 (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
The Dream Act, DACA, and Other Policies Designed to Protect Dreamers, AM.
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/
research/the_dream_act_daca_and_other_policies_designed_to_protect_dreamers.pdf
(last visited Nov. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Policies Designed to Protect Dreamers].
14
Id.
15
Id.; see also Yamiche Alcindor & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, After 16 Futile Years,
Congress Will Try Again to Legalize ‘Dreamers’, N.Y. Times (Sept. 5, 2017) https://www.
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Obama’s Creation of DACA

In reaction to the various failed attempts by Congress to pass the
Dream Act, or any bills that would fix the “broken immigration system,”
President Obama along with Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet
Napolitano, announced administrative steps he would take in lieu of
legislation on June 15, 2012. 16 These actions sought to “mend our nation’s
immigration policy, to make it more fair, more efficient, and more just—
specifically for certain young people sometimes called ‘Dreamers.’” 17 The
Department of Homeland Security took immediate steps to implement
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). 18 “DACA [was] an
“exercise of prosecutorial discretion, providing temporary relief from
deportation (deferred action) and work authorization to certain young
undocumented immigrants brought to the United States as children.” 19
In her memorandum to the acting commissioner of the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), director for U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), and director of U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), Secretary Napolitano laid out the criteria for
an individual to be granted DACA. 20 This criteria required that the
individual (1) “came to the United States under the age of sixteen”; (2)
continuously resided in the U.S. for at least five years before June 5, 2012,
and was present in the U.S. on June 5, 2012; (3) is currently in school,
graduated from high school or attained a GED certificate, or was
honorably discharged from the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United
States; (4) does not have any felony, significant misdemeanor, or multiple
misdemeanor convictions, and does not pose a threat to the national
security or public safety; and (5) was under the age of thirty-one as of June
15, 2012. 21 As created, the program granted recipients deferral of removal
nytimes.com/2017/09/05/us/politics/dream-act-daca-trump-congress-dreame rs.html (This
article documents how in the past sixteen years Congress has failed to pass a bill in order
to get it to the President’s desk. The closest attempt was in 2013, when the Senate passed
the Dream Act as part of a “broader immigration package” that included language allowing
dreamers to stay, work and attend school.” The bill passed the Senate with 68 votes, but
then failed in the House.).
16
President Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration, THE WHITE HOUSE (June
15, 2012), https://obamawhitehowe.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-pre
sident-immigration.
17
Id.
18
Id.; see also Policies Designed to Protect Dreamers, supra note 13.
19
Policies Designed to Protect Dreamers, supra note 13.
20
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec. on Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as
Children (June 15, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosec
utorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
21
Id.
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proceedings, as well as the opportunity to legally work through the
issuance of an employment authorization document and a social security
number. 22 It was estimated that about 900,000 individuals were
“immediately eligible for deferred action at the date of the
announcement.” 23 Between August 15, 2012, and June 30, 2013, USCIS
received about 557,412 applications. 24 According to recent information,
as of March 31, 2017, about 787,000 applications for initial DACA
protections had been approved. 25

C.

Trump’s Recession of DACA

On September 5, 2017, the Trump administration announced that it
would begin phasing out the program. 26 Attorney General Sessions
announced that no new applications would be accepted as of September 5,
2017; and that current DACA recipients whose status expired on or before
March 5, 2018, could renew their status if their application was received
by October 5, 2017. 27 Trump called on Congress to pass legislation
replacing DACA. 28 However, as of the date of this note, Congress has yet
to answer the call, leaving thousands of people to lose their DACA status
in the next few years, unless the current court rulings discussed later in this
note are upheld—saving the program. 29 When he announced the phasing
out of DACA, Attorney General Sessions stated that part of the reasoning
behind the administration’s decision to rescind the program included: (1)
22
Marisa Bono, When a Rose is not a Rose: DACA, The Dream Act, and The Need for
More Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 40 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 193, 214 (2015).
23
Nicole Prchal Svajlenka & Audrey Singer, Immigration Facts: Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA), BROOKINGS (Aug. 14, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/immigration-facts-deferred-action-for-childhood-arrivals-daca/.
24
Id.
25
Dara Lind, How many immigrants have DACA, really? We finally have one answer—
just as they start to lose it., VOX (Oct. 6, 2017, 10:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2017/10/6/16431524/daca-how-many.
26
David Nakamura, Trump administration announces end of immigration protection
program for ‘dreamers,’ WASH POST (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-politics/wp/2017/09/05/trump-administratio n-announces-end-of-immigrationprotection-program-for-dreamers/.
27
Emily Tillett, Jeff Sessions announces DACA program to be rescinded, CBS NEWS
(Sept. 5, 2017, 3:10 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-daca-decision-jeffsessions-press-briefing-live-updates/.
28
Donald Trump is right: Congress should pass DACA, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 9, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/09/09/donald-trump-is-right-congress-shouldpass-daca.
29
Furthermore on November 12, 2019, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments
regarding whether DACA was lawful/constitutional, see Elizabeth Redden, Supreme Court
Takes up DACA, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/
news/2019/11/13/supreme-court-hears-arguments-daca.
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President Obama’s decision to “unilaterally” implement the program
despite Congress’s lack of action on the DREAM Act, and that this “openended circumvention of immigration laws was an unconstitutional
exercise of authority by the Executive Branch”; (2) the creation of the
DACA program contributed to the “surge of unaccompanied minors”; and
(3) the program took away jobs from “hundreds of thousands of
Americans.” 30
The reasoning behind Trump’s decision to end DACA is flawed.
Although President Obama did unilaterally implement DACA, he did not
circumvent immigration law. President Obama made the decision to
emphasize immigration enforcement on those who engaged in criminal
activity. 31 However, this is a debated topic that will not be addressed in
this note, but could be a topic for a future note as the courts continue to
deal with the issue. Additionally, DACA did not contribute to a “surge in
unaccompanied minors.” 32 A study conducted by International Migration
“revealed that DACA did not significantly contribute to the observed
increase in unaccompanied minors.” 33 The authors concluded that the
“2008 Williams Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act, along with violence in the originating countries and
economic conditions in both the origin countries and the United States,”
were the “key determinants” in the increase of unaccompanied minors.34
30
Attorney General Sessions, Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks on DACA:
Remarks as prepared for delivery, DOJ (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-daca.
31
Edwin Mora, Obama on Non-Criminal Illegal Aliens: We Don’t Want to Deport
Them; ‘We Want Them To Succeed,’ CNS NEWS (Mar. 28, 2011, 4:44 pM) https://www.
cnsnews.com/news/article/obama-non-criminal-illegal-aliens-we-don-t-want-deportthem-we-want-them-succeed (this note, however, does not address this point as it would
likely make for a note of its own).
32
Alex Nowrasteh, DACA Did Not Cause the Surge in Unaccompanied Children, CATO
INSTITUTE (July 29, 2014, 3:41 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/daca-did-not-cause-surgeunaccompanied-children; Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes & Thitima Puttitanun, Was DACA
Responsible for the Surge in Unaccompanied Minors on the Southern Border?, 55 INT’L
MIGRATION 12, 13 (Dec. 2017), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/imig.2017.
55.issue-6/issuetoc.
33
Amuedo-Dorantes & Puttitanun, supra note 32.
34
Id.; see also Glenn Kessler, The Trump administration’s claim that DACA ‘helped
spur’ the 2014 surge of minors crossing the border, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/09/06/the-trump-administr
ations-claim-that-daca-helped-spur-the-2014-surge-of-minors-crossing-the-border/?utm_
term=.84b874005069 (claims that the surge of unaccompanied minors was not a result of
DACA, but instead a result of a belief that these children could get “permisos” (permits).
This was not a reference to DACA but instead to “the fact that children from countries that
did not border the United States were allowed to stay in the United States, with relatives,
until they faced deportation hearings—and at the time [, 2014, it was taking] a year or
more.” This was the effect of a 2008 anti-trafficking law that was signed by President
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Furthermore, although the majority of DACA recipients are employed,
economists argue that there is no evidence to suggest that DACA
recipients are taking jobs away from Americans. 35 According to Ray
Perryman, president and CEO of the Texas economic research firm the
Perryman Group, at the time of the decision to end DACA, the country
was “at full employment with more job openings than at any point in
history,” and “[w]e desperately need workers in this country.” 36 Allowing
DACA recipients to work would actually increase jobs and continue
bolstering the economy. 37

D.

The Courts Become Involved

Although the Trump administration announced that it would begin
phasing out DACA on September 5, 2017, 38 several federal courts have

George W. Bush—Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). In fact,
the article points out how the surge that the White House referred to occurred in 2014. To
qualify for DACA, a minor had to arrive in the U.S. before Obama’s June 15,2012,
implementation of the program. Therefore, the unaccompanied minors did not qualify.);
see also Raul A. Reyes, Fact Checking Attorney General Jeff Sessions on DACA, NBC
NEWS (Sep. 7, 2017, 11:25 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/fact-checkingattorney-general-jeff-sessions-daca-n799366 (checking the remark made by Attorney
General Sessions the author states, “[t]he influx of unaccompanied minors from Central
America actually began in 2008, four years before Obama announced DACA. While these
young people could seek asylum or Special Immigrant Juvenile status, they are ineligible
for DACA because the program requires continuous residency in the U.S. since 2017.”
Furthermore, “research and reporting” show that other “push factors” had an actual impact,
such as “deadly gangs and violence, that have driven these young people to flee their
homeland.”).
35
Danielle Kurtzleben, Fact Check: Are DACA Recipients Stealing Jobs Away From
Other Americans?, NPR (Sept. 6, 2017, 3:12 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/06/
548882071/fact-check-are-daca-recipients-stealing-jobs-away-from-other-americans; see
also, Bryce Covert, No, DACA Immigrants Aren’t Stealing American Jobs, NEW REPUBLIC
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.newrepublic.com/article/144720/no-daca-immigrants-arentstealing-american-jobs (uses other economist to explain how the economy works, in
relation to job availability. “[A]llowing DACA recipients to work legally and earn more,
thereby opening up more economic opportunities to them that pay dividends to everyone
else—is how the economy works generally. To assume that immigrants steal jobs is to
assume that work is a zero-sum game: if I get work, I’ve taken it away from you. But that’s
not how things function in practice, because there is not fixed amount of work to be divvied
up. This is what economists have come to call the ‘lump of labor’ fallacy.” If there were
only a certain amount of jobs available in the economy, then the country would have been
dealing with an “ongoing, incurable mass unemployment.” Allowing immigrants to get
jobs, helps the economy and creates even more jobs.).
36
Kurtzleben, supra note 35.
37
Id.
38
Segal, supra note 9, at 1.
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issued temporary victories for Dreamers. 39 Although these victories are a
step in the right direction, they do not solve the issue indefinitely.
Congress has still failed to act as of March 5, 2018, which is the date that
Trump picked as the “‘expiration date’ for DACA recipients
themselves.” 40 In fact, on April 1, 2018, Trump tweeted that there was
“NO MORE DACA DEAL!,” and “directed congressional Republicans to
pass tough anti-immigration legislation.” 41
Following Trump’s decision to terminate DACA, multiple lawsuits
were filed across the country seeking to either halt the government’s
termination of DACA or challenging the constitutionality of the DACA
program. 42 This led to two U.S. district courts enjoining/halting the
government’s termination of DACA and requiring USCIS to continue
accepting DACA renewal applications from those who already had
DACA. 43 Another U.S. district court (in the district of Maryland) “ordered
the government to follow its original 2012 policy of not sharing DACA
recipients’ private information for enforcement purposes.” 44 A fourth
district court (in the District of Columbia) has also issued orders that have
struck down Trump’s decision to terminate DACA, and it has also
reinstated the program. 45 “On May 1, 2018, Texas and six other states
[also] filed a lawsuit . . . challenging the 2012 DACA program itself.” 46
“[T]he plaintiffs asked the court to issue a preliminary injunction that
would stop USCIS from adjudicating applications for deferred action
under DACA” until the court ruled on the issue. 47 However, after hearing
the request by the states the court concluded that “such an injunction
would not be in the public’s interest.” Therefore, as of the last update of
this note, it is still the case that “individuals who have or have previously
had DACA can apply to renew it.” 48

See Status of Current DACA Litigation, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR. (last updated
June 7, 2019), https://www.nilc.org/issues/daca/status-current-daca-litigation/.
40
See Dara Lind, What the Supreme Court’s DACA Ruling—and the March 5
“deadline”—actually means for immigrants, VOX (last updated Mar. 5, 2018, 10:31 AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/2/16/17015818/daca-deadline-trump-drea
mers-march-5.
41
Philip Rucker & David Weigel, ‘No more DACA deal,’ Trump says as he threatens to
‘stop’ NAFTA if Mexico doesn’t better secure border, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2018/04/01/deal-on-daca-no-mo
re-trump-says/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.88171c675009.
42
See Status of Current DACA Litigation, supra note 39.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
39
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On January 9, 2018, in Regents of the University of California, et al.
v. Department of Homeland Security, et al., “a federal judge in California
issued an injunction [ . . . ] and told [USCIS] to make a reasonably timely
plan to resume accepting renewal applications.”49 After the preliminary
injunction was issued, “the government [sought] to skip review in the
Ninth Circuit and [] appeal[ed] directly to the U.S. Supreme Court through
a rarely used legal mechanism[—certiorari] before judgment.” 50 This kind
of request requires a “showing that the case is of such imperative public
importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to
require immediate determination in [the Supreme Court].” 51 On February
26, 2018, the Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal to the California
federal judge’s ruling, and issued a brief order stating that “[i]t assumed
the court of appeals will act expeditiously to decide the case.”52 “On
November 8, 2018, the Ninth Circuit,” after hearing oral arguments,
“issued a decision [upholding] the preliminary injunction.” 53 “To date, the
preliminary injunction issued in U.C. Regents remains in effect, and
DACA recipients are eligible to continue applying to renew their DACA”
status. 54
On February 13, 2018, another federal judge, in New York, also issued
an injunction, in Batalla Vidal v. Nielson and State of New York, et al. v.
Trump, et al. 55, and ordered USCIS to keep accepting renewal
See Dara Lind, March 5 is supposed to be the DACA “deadline.” Here’s what that
means for immigrants., VOX (Mar. 5, 2018, 10:31 a.m.), https://www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2018/2/16/17015818/daca-deadline-trump-dreamers-march-5;
see
also
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1048-49
(N.D. Cal. 2018); ALERT: Court Orders the Department of Homeland Security to Allow
Individuals with DACA to Apply to Renew It, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR. (Jan. 10,
2018),
https://www.nilc.org/issues/daca/daca-preliminary-injunction-regents-v-dhs/
(affecting only “DACA recipients who have been unable to renew their DACA after the
government’s Sept. 5, 2017, DACA termination announcement because of one of the
following—(1) their DACA expired before Sept. 5, 2017, (2) their DACA expiration date
falls after March 5, 2018, or (3) their renewal application was rejected due to clerical
error . . . “).
50
See Status of Current DACA Litigation, supra note 39 (the government filed its
petition of certiorari with the Supreme Court on January 18, 2018).
51
Id. (citing Supreme Court Rule 11, pg.6 https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules
/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf).
52
See Pete Williams, In blow to Trump, Supreme Court won’t hear appeal of DACA
ruling, NBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2018, 12:31 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politicsnews/supreme-court-won-t-hear-daca-case-n851186.
53
Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No.
18-15068, 2018 BL 89926 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 2018)).
54
See Status of Current DACA Litigation, supra note 39.
55
The Batalla Vidal case was brought by six DACA recipients from New York, and the
State of New York case was brought by a coalition of seventeen attorneys general. See also
Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018).
49
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applications. 56 This injunction was the “same in scope” as the one issued
by the district court in California. 57 The court held that “there was a
substantial likelihood that the plaintiffs would prevail on their claim that
the Trump administration ended DACA in a way that was arbitrary and
capricious, and therefore unlawful.” 58
On March 5, 2018, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland
also issued an opinion on DACA. 59 The court dismissed most of the
plaintiff’s claims, including the claim that the termination of DACA was
unlawful. 60 However, the court did grant a nationwide preliminary
injunction to DACA recipients on the claim regarding the sharing and
usage of the information DACA recipients provide the government when
they apply for DACA. 61 The plaintiff’s appealed the dismissal of their
claim—that the termination of DACA was unlawful—in the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 62 On May 17, 2019, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held DHS had failed to give a reasoned explanation for its change
in policy when it rescinded DACA, and therefore the decision was
arbitrary and capricious. 63 The Department of Justice filed a petition for
writ of certiorari asking the Supreme Court to review the decision issued
by the Fourth Circuit, and for an expedited briefing schedule to allow the
Court to consider its petition before the end of the Court’s term. 64
However, the Court denied the expedited consideration request on June 3,
2019, but not certiorari. 65
In a more recent decision from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, a federal judge ruled that DACA protections must
be reinstated as ruled by other federal judges. 66 However, Judge John D.
Id.; see also Vidal vs. Nielsen, Secretary, DHS, Memorandum & Order, 16-CV-4756
(NGG) (JO), available at http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2018/images/02/13/orderdaca.pdf.
57
See Status of Current DACA Litigation,, supra note 39.
58
Id.; see also Vidal v. Nielsen, No. 16-cv-4756 (NGG) (JO), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3179 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 08, 2018).
59
Casa de Md., et al. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., et al., 284 F. Supp. 3d 758 (D. Md.
Mar. 5, 2018).
60
Id. at 779.
61
Id.
62
Casa de Md. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 924 F.3d 684, 705 (4th Cir. May 17,
2019).
63
Id.
64
DACA Litigation Timeline, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR. (Sept. 28, 2019), https://
www.nilc.org/issues/daca/daca-litigation-timeline/.
65
Id.
66
Miriam Jordan, U.S. Must Keep DACA and Accept New Applications, Federal Judge
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/24/us/dacadreamers-trump.html; see also Trustees of Princeton University, et al. v. United States of
America, 1:17-cv-02325-JBD (Apr. 24, 2018), https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin /show
_public_doc?2017cv1907-23.
56
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Bates went ever further and ordered the government to accept new
applications. 67 The decision was based on the fact that “[o]ne of the basic
procedural requirements of administrative rulemaking is that an agency
must give adequate reasons for its decisions.” 68 Accordingly, the court
held that the government’s reasoning “was insufficient to satisfy the
Department’s obligation to explain its departure from its prior stated view
that DACA was lawful.” 69 “In concluding that DACA was implemented
‘without statutory authority,’ neither the Sessions Letter nor the Rescission
Memo cited any statutory provision with which DACA was in conflict.” 70
Although the court ruled that the government must resume DACA
including new applications, it did stay its order giving the government
ninety-days for DHS to “better explain its rescission decision.” 71 This
same decision also applied to, NAACP v. Trump, due to the fact that the
court found that the cases were related to each other.72 Responding to the
Judge’s decision, on June 22, 2018, DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen issued
a new memorandum, which “concur[s] with and decline[s] to disturb” the
September 5, 2017, memorandum that rescinded the enforcement of
DACA. 73 The government then asked Judge Bates to reconsider his prior
order, stating that Secretary Nielsen’s new memorandum provided more
details on the government’s decision to end DACA. 74 However, on August
3, 2018, Judge Bates found that the new memorandum did not present
“impermissibly post hoc rationalizations.” 75 Ultimately, the District Court
for the District of Columbia, ordered that the Trump administration’s
termination of the DACA program be vacated, however, the order has been
stayed, which effectively leaves its order that USCIS process DACA
renewal applications in effect, but it does not reimplement the entire
program itself. 76
On May 1, 2018, Texas along with Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana,
Nebraska, South Carolina, and West Virginia filed a lawsuit against the
federal government challenging the creation of the DACA program. 77
Jordan, supra note 66, at 1.
Trustees of Princeton University, supra note 66, at 41 (citing Encino Motorcars, 136
S. Ct. at 2125).
69
Id. at 42.
70
Id.
71
Jordan, supra note 66, at 1.
72
NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D.D.C. 2018).
73
Memorandum from Secretary Kirstjen M. Nielsen on the “Duke memorandum” and
the rescinding of DACA (June 22, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/18_0622_S1_Memorandum_DACA.pdf.
74
See Status of Current DACA Litigation, supra note 39.
75
NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 465-66.
76
See Status of Current DACA Litigation, supra note 39.
77
Texas v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 3d 662 (S.D. Tex. 2018).
67
68
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Afterward, the state of Kansas and the governors of Mississippi and Maine
also joined the lawsuit against DACA. 78 The plaintiffs sought a declaration
that DACA was unlawful and a nationwide order that prohibited the
federal government from issuing any new deferrals. 79 On August 31, 2018,
the court found that DHS “lacked statutory authority to implement the
DACA program.” 80 Further, the court expressed that the “states had a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the claim that DACA []
violated the [Administrative Procedure Act’s] notice-and-comment
requirements.” 81 However, the court denied the plaintiff’s request for a
preliminary injunction finding that the states had failed to show that they
would likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary
injunction and that the factors regarding hardship to the parties and the
public interest weighed against the issuance of an injunction. 82
On June 28, 2019, the Supreme Court announced that it would review
three cases (Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University
of California, Trump v. NAACP and McAleenan v. Vidal) challenging the
Trump administration’s decision to end DACA, despite it having held that
“[t]he exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty . . . inherent
in the executive power.” 83 The Court’s decision is not expected until early
2020, which would put the DACA program as part of the presidential
campaign unless congress acts prior to the Court issuing a decision.84 Until
then, DACA recipients remain in a world of uncertainty about their
futures.

78

See id.
Status of Current DACA Litigation, supra note 39.
80
Texas v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 3d 662, 713-14 (S.D. Tex. 2018).
81
Id. at 735.
82
Id. at 736-43.
83
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); see also Brenda Solorzano, What
Happens to Dreamers now that the Supreme Court is Hearing the DACA Case?,
IMMIGRATION IMPACT (July 2, 2019), http://immigrationimpact.com/2019/07/02/whathappens-to-dreamers-now-that-the-supreme-court-is-hearing-daca-case/#.XUpEj5NKiu0;
Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to review DACA program protecting young undocumented
immigrants, WASH. POST (June 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
courts_law/supreme-court-to-review-daca-program-protecting-young-undocumented-im
migrants/2019/06/28/c69a8b04-1500-11e9-b6ad-9cfd62dbb0a8_story.html?noredirect=o
n.
84
Solorzano, supra note 83; Pete Williams, Supreme Court agrees to hear DACA case
in win for Trump administration, NBC NEWS (June 28, 2019), https://www.nbcnews
.com/politics/supreme-court/supreme-court-agrees-hear-daca-case-win-trumpadministration-n1020481.
79
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COUNTRY CONDITIONS

Although at first those eligible for DACA were hesitant to turn over
their information to the authorities, eventually about 800,000 individuals
did so and were approved. 85 According to the Migration Policy Institute,
anywhere from one million to 1.9 million individuals were eligible to
participate in the DACA program. 86 Of those eligible, the Williams
Institute estimates that “there are about 75,000 LGBT DREAMers in the
U.S.” and more than 36,000 of these have benefited from DACA. 87 Some
of the top countries of origin of eligible DACA youth and DACA
applications accepted for processing are Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Peru, the Philippines, Colombia, and the Dominican
Republic. 88 These countries have made significant strides to protect
LGBTQ+ individuals. However, the protections are not enough to end
persecution, violence, discrimination, and killings against LGBTQ+
identified members.

85
See Alcindor & Stolberg, After 16 Futile Years, Congress will try again to legalize
‘Dreamers,’ NY TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/us/politics/dream-act-dacatrump-congress-dreamers.html; see also Jens Manuel Krogstad, DACA has shielded nearly
790,000 young unauthorized immigrants form deportation, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 1,
2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/01/unauthorized-immigrants-cover
ed-by-daca-face-uncertain-future/; see also Trustees of Princeton University, supra note
66, at 4 (acknowledging that “to be considered for deferred action under DACA, an
applicant had to provide DHS with certain identifying information, including her name,
mailing address, and contact information. “[M]any applicants feared that this information
would later be used to initiate removal proceedings against them.” However, relying in
DHS’s assurance that “their information would in most cases be ‘protected from disclosure
to [U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)] and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) for the purpose of immigration enforcement proceedings” about 800,000
youth applied. This has led to at least one case “enjoin[ing] DHS from ‘using information
provided by Dreamers through the DACA program for enforcement purposes,’ explaining
that so doing would violate applicable principles of equitable estoppel. (citing Casa de Md.
v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 284 F. Supp. 3 d 748, 779 (D. Md. 2018)).
86
Jeanne Batalova, et. al., Deferred Action For Childhood Arrivals at the One-Year
Mark: A Profile of Currently Eligible Youth and Applicants, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Aug.
2013) at 6, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deferred-action-childhood-arrivalsone-year-mark-profile-currently-eligible-youth-and; see also Faye Hipsman et al., DACA
at Four: Participation in the Deferred Action Program and Impacts on Recipients,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Aug. 2016), file:///Users/candelariosaldana/Downloads/DACA
atFour-FINAL.pdf.
87
THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/media-advi
sory-there-are-over-75000-lgbt-dreamers-36000-have-participated-in-daca/ (last visited
Sept. 13, 2019).
88
Batalova, supra note 86, at 6.
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Mexico

Although Mexico has made progress in passing laws that are meant to
protect LGBTQI individuals, violence is still prevalent. 89 Mexico’s laws
prohibit discrimination against LGBTI individuals.90 However, reports
show that the government does “not always investigate and punish those
complicit in abuses” against LGBTI individuals. 91 This is particularly true
outside of Mexico City. 92 LGBTQI individuals are not only the subjects
of discrimination by private individuals, but they are also victims at the
hands of state agents. 93 Police routinely mistreat LGBTI people while they
are in custody. 94 Furthermore, when LGBTI individuals are victims of hate
Sharita Gruberg, What Ending DACA Means for LGBTQ Dreamers, CTR. FOR AM.
PRESS (Oct. 11, 2017, 11:08 am), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/
2017/10/11/440450/ending-daca-means-lgbtq-dreamers/; see also Brief for the UNHCR,
at 4, Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1072 (2017), available at
http://www.refworld.org/type,AMICUS,UNHCR,USA,57447af34,0.html (stating that
although a country might have “de jure commitment to LGBTI protections” it is not always
equivalent to the “de facto reality of whether the State is able and willing to provide
protection from those who persecute LGBTI individuals within its borders.” In many
countries being able to be “oneself without fear of persecution remains a distant aspiration”
for many LGBTI identified individuals. In Mexico, this is the reality even though it has
passed many laws that are meant to protect the LGBTI population, the Supreme Court of
the country has also stated that marriage must be extended to same-sex couples. Despite
all these improvements UNHCR has “on two occasions since the 2011 statement
documented that Mexico has much work to implement the standards referenced in
UNHCR’s press release.” A study done by the Human Rights Council demonstrates that
the reality in Mexico is that”[w]hile some progress has been made since the first study in
2011, the overall picture remains one of continuing, pervasive, violent abuse, harassment
and discrimination affecting [LGBTI] persons in all regions. These constitute serious
human rights violations, often perpetrated with impunity, indicating that current
arrangements to protect the human rights of [LGBTI] persons are inadequate.” In another
report by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
Christof Heyns found that “‘[k]illings of LGBT individuals are marked by either a total
failure to investigate or a faulty investigation guided by stereotypes and
prejudice . . . .[C]rimes and human rights violations based on sexual orientation, gender
identity or expression are not isolated, but are emblematic of patterns of conduct of some
members of society and recurrent actions of certain public servants including prejudices,
dislikes and rejections, reflecting the existence of a serious structural problem of
intolerance.’”); see also United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns,
A/HRC/26/36/Add.1 (Apr. 28, 2014), available from http://tinyurl.com/HeynsMexico
(documenting how homicides of LGBT individuals are often done with the “complicity of
investigative authorities).
90
Mexico 2016 Human Rights Report, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, at 26, https://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/265812.pdf (last visited Jan 2. 2017).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
See id. at 26-27.
94
Id.
89
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crimes, including killings, the crimes are “often mischaracterized [] as
‘crimes of passion,’ which resulted in the authorities’ failure to adequately
investigate, prosecute, or punish these incidents.” 95 In its 2016 human
rights report, the U.S. Department states: “The Executive Committee for
Victims Assistance, an independent federal agency completed a survey
[of] 435 lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender persons. Seven of 10
respondents reported discrimination in schools; half reported employment
discrimination or harassment; and six of 10 reported having known an
LGBT person murdered in the past three years.” 96 In its December 2015
report on the human rights situation in Mexico, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights discusses the murders and attacks against
LGBT people in more detail. 97 According to the report:
“The Commission’s Special Rapporteur on the rights of
LGBTI persons received information that in a period of
15 months (between January 2013 and March 2014), there
were a total of 42 murders and 2 attacks on physical
integrity in Mexico (both knife attacks) against
transgender people (or perceived as such); 4 attacks on the
physical integrity of lesbians (or perceived as such), 3 of
which were beatings and one death threat; and 37 murders
of gay men (or perceived as such) and two attacks on the
physical integrity, including a case of mutilation where
the victim’s eyes were torn out, and another related case
of sexual violence and beatings from Police agents.” 98
The murders of LGBTQI individuals, or individuals perceived to have
an LGBTQI identity, continues to be a problem in Mexico. 99 Sending
LGBTQI identified DACA recipients back to Mexico, the country with the
most DACA recipients, 100 would only put these individuals at risk of
facing discrimination or death.
Courts have also established that persecution against LGBTQI
individuals in Mexico is still a problem. In Avendano-Hernandez v.
95

Id.
Id.; see also Mexico: Sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI), Austrian Red
Cross/ACCORD (May 2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/972466/download.
97
Austrian Red Cross/ACCORD, supra note 97, at 32.
98
Id.
99
Id. (stating that “[b]etween 1995 and 2014 there were 1,218 murders in Mexico
motivated by prejudice against individuals because of their real or perceived sexual
orientation and/or gender identity . . . .”).
100
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Data Tools, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/deferred-action-childhood-arrivalsdaca-profiles (last visited Jan. 2, 2018).
96
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Lyncch, 800 F.3d 1072 (2015), the court remanded the case for a grant of
relief under CAT, stating that although Mexico has recently passed antidiscrimination laws, it has not made life safer for transgender individuals,
and that there was “significant evidence of violence targeting [transgender
individuals].” 101 In this case, a transgender woman who was feminine
since she was young and wore makeup and dresses, was frequently the
victim of harassment and physical and sexual abuse. 102 When she was
young, her father “brutally beat her and called her ‘faggot’ and ‘queer.’” 103
She was also sexually abused by her elder brothers and cousins, who
forced her to perform oral sex, raped her, and beat her when she tried to
resist their attacks. 104 However, she was not only the victim at the hands
of family members or other members of the community. “One evening,
when Avendano-Hernandez was on her way to visit family in Oaxaca’s
capital city, armed uniformed police officers stationed at a roadside
checkpoint hurled insults at her as she walked past them.” 105 They grabbed
her and forced her into the bed of their truck, and drove her to an unknown
location where they forced her to perform oral sex and raped her while
shouting homophobic slurs. 106 On a different occasion, when she
attempted to cross the border she encountered a group of uniformed
Mexican military officers who also called her “faggot” and “[o]ne of the
officers forced her to perform oral sex on him, while the rest of the group
watched and laughed.” 107 The court held that although Mexico had passed
laws “purporting to protect the gay and lesbian community” it did not
always protect the transgender community from “discrimination, police
harassment, and violent attacks in daily life.” 108 And although the case
involved a transgender woman, the court’s decision illustrates that
LGBTQI individuals in general continue to be victims of discrimination
and hate crimes in Mexico. The court states that “the passage of these laws
Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1075 (2015); see also Boer-Sedano v.
Gonzalez, 418 F.3d 1083, 1091-92 (2005) (holding that IJ erred in finding that petitioner
no longer had a well-founded fear of prosecution because “[i]n light of the evidence of
continuing persecution of homosexuals in Mexico, no reasonable factfinder could find that
Boer-Sedano’s return trips alone demonstrate a fundamental change in circumstances to
show that Boer-Sedano no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution”).
102
Id.; see also Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006)
(considering a “withholding of removal claim by a Mexican gay male who ‘suffered a great
deal of abuse . . . because of his homosexuality and female sexual identity’; he was beaten
by his parents and raped by his father’s friend, his cousins, and a worker at his grandfather’s
hacienda.”).
103
Avendano-Hernandez, 800 F.3d at 1075.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 1076.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 1076-77.
108
Id. at 1080.
101
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has made the situation . . . paradoxically become increasingly more
perilous [for the gay, lesbian, and transgender community], as the public
and authorities react to their expressions of a form of sexuality that the
culture does not embrace and, in fact, fears.” 109 In fact, Mexico City, a city
where “arguably the most efforts have been made to protect the rights of
sexual minorities,” continues to be unsafe for LGBTQI individuals. In
2010, after the passage of several laws and same-sex marriage, Mexico
City had the highest number of hate crimes. 110 There is also a “continued
failure to prosecute the perpetrators of homophobic hate crimes
throughout Mexico.” 111

B.

El Salvador

Discrimination and violence against LGBTI people in El Salvador is
also widespread. 112 According to the U.S. Department of State’s Human
Rights Report on El Salvador, there have been reports by NGOs that
“public officials, including police, engaged in violence and discrimination
against sexual minorities.” 113 The report states that LGBTI individuals
109
Id. at 1081-82 (quoting Declaration of Dr. Nielan Barnes, Mar. 5, 2013, ECF No. 6-1
at 412) (internal quotations omitted).
110
Id. at 1082; see also Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F. 3d 1051, 1057 (2017)
(“Additionally he submitted 2009 and 2010 U.S. Department of State County Reports for
Mexico and several newspaper articles that documented violence against, including
murders of, gays and lesbians. The reports showed that the violence rose even as—and
perhaps because—Mexican laws were becoming increasingly tolerant of gay rights.”).
111
Avendano-Hernandez, 800 F.3d at 1082; see also Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850
F.3d 1051, 1057-1075 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining how respondent testified that his gay
friends had gone to the police to report that they had been raped, but the police officers
“ignored their reports and ‘laughed on their faces.” He also submitted country conditions
that demonstrated that violence against LGBTI individuals had risen perhaps because the
Mexican government had passed laws that were “tolerant of gay rights.” The court also
acknowledged that although “Mexico is to be lauded for its efforts,” it is “well recognized
that a country’s laws are not always reflective of actual country conditions.” The court in
its decision that Mexico was unwilling and unable to protect the respondent, quoted a 2010
U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports for Mexico in which a “particularly severe
example of discrimination by Mexican officials” occurred. In that instance Agustin
Humberto Estrada Negrete, a teacher and gay activist from Ecatepec, Mexico State was
dismissed from his teaching position. After his dismissal, he began lobbying the
government to reinstate him. While attending a meeting with state officials he was beaten
by police, taken to prison, threatened, and raped. Even after he was released he still faced
harassment by state authorities.); see also Maestro victim de homophobia denuncia
violacion y amenazas, LAJORNADA (June 12, 2009), http://www.jornada.unam.mx/
2009/06/12/estados/035n1est (discussing Augustin Humberto Estrada Negrete’s
accusations of Mexican police authorities).
112
U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., El Salvador 2017 Human
Rights Report 5 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/
2018/04/24/dos-hrr_2017_el_salvador.pdf.
113
Id.
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have reported that “agencies in charge of processing identification
documents, the PNC, and the Attorney General’s Office harassed
transgender and gay individuals when they applied for identification cards
or reported violence against LGBTI persons.” 114
Like Mexico, El Salvador has also made progress in protecting LGBTI
rights. 115 In 2010, “President Funes issued Executive Decree 562, which
prohibits public sector employees from discriminating because of sexual
orientation and gender identity.” 116 “The Decree also created the National
Directorate for Sexual Diversity within the office of the Secretary of Social
Inclusion.” 117 The goal was to “eradicat[e] discrimination against LGBT
individuals, promot[e] inclusive policies, ensur[e] equal treatment in the
provision of services, and increase[e] awareness and sensitivity about the
LGBT community.” 118 However, despite the decree, the country continues
to grapple with discrimination and violence against LGBT individuals. 119
An activist compares the decree as a “letter to Santa Clause: a list of all
these things that would be nice to have, someday[,]” 120 because despite the
decree, “epidemic levels of violent crime and alarming rates of impunity

Id. at 5 (according to the report “[t]he NGO Association of Communication and
Training of Transgender Women with HIV in El Salvador (COMCAVIS Trans) reported
that, as of September, a total of 28 LGBTI persons were attacked or killed because of their
sexual orientation.”); see also 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: El
Salvador, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.state.gov/reports/2018country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/el-salvador/ (“NGOs reported that pubic
officials, including police, engaged in violence and discrimination against sexual
minorities. Persons from the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI)
community stated that the PNC, and the Attorney General’s Office harassed transgender
and gay individuals when they reported cases of violence against LGBTI persons, including
by conducting strip searches.”).
115
Allison Davenport, SEXUAL DIVERSITY IN EL SALVADOR (Laurel E. Fletcher ed.,
2012), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/IHRLC/LGBT_Report_English_Final_120705
.pdf.
116
The process of Decree 56 in El Salvador “Its existence is an achievement. The
problem is that discrimination continues.,” LGBTQ POL’Y J. A HARVARD KENNEDY SCH.
STUDENT PUBL’N (Oct. 21, 2013), https://lgbtq.hkspublications.org/2013/10/21/the-process
-of-decree-56-in-el-salvador-its-existence-is-an-achievement-the-problem-is-that-discrimi
nation-continues/.
117
Davenport, supra note 115, at I.
118
Id. at 19.
119
Id.; see also The process of Decree 56 in El Salvador “Its existence is an achievement.
The problem is that discrimination continues.”, supra note 116 (using examples of the
continual discrimination and violence, both by state and non-state actors, that goes without
actual justice).
120
The process of Decree 56 in El Salvador “Its existence is an achievement. The
problem is that discrimination continues.”, supra note 116 (quoting activist Paty
Hernandez) (internal quotations omitted).
114
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are the backdrop against which LGBT individuals experience violence and
harassment.” 121
Another major problem in El Salvador are gangs, which have “evolved
into sophisticated organized crime networks, capable of terrorizing entire
communities and manipulating the justice system.”122 Because of their size
and power, they can get away with the violence they perpetrate against the
LGBTI community. 123 According to a report on the violations of the rights
of LGBT people in El Salvador, gangs often use violence against LGBT
individuals for initiation purposes and have not been held accountable. 124
Members of the LGBT community believe that they are a particularly easy
target for violence because perpetrators know the police are “less likely to
investigate crimes against LGBT individuals.” 125

121
See DAVENPORT, supra note 115, at I; see also Rafael Cortez, Karin-Annabela
Revuelta & Yolanda Guirola, Adolescent Sexual and Reproductive Health in El Salvador,
WBG (June 2015), at 35, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/540771467987
846262/pdf/102611-WP-PUBLIC-Box394833B-ElSalvadorASRH.pdf (“The study also
found that LGBT individuals were exposed to high levels of discrimination, despite the
government’s efforts to protect and guarantee their rights in recent years.”).
122
Id. at 14; see also Nelson Renteria, Transgender Murders in El Salvador Leave
Community in Fear, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.
com/entry/el-salvador-transgender-murders_us_58dac266e4b01ca7b4278e8a (explaining
that in February 2017, three transgender people were murdered, sending fear in members
of the LGBT community. “The spate of murders puts a spotlight on the violence El
Salvador’s LGBT community faces, a problem rights activists blame on powerful street
gangs and entrenched social prejudices . . . The gangs don’t accept lesbians, gay boys or
transgender people. Diversity doesn’t fit into their rules . . . Not only are LGBT people
victims of general gang violence, like other Salvadorans, they are also persecuted because
of their sexual orientation . . . A 2013 survey by the U.S.-based Pew Research Centre found
nearly two thirds of Salvadorans believed society should not accept homosexuality.”);
Anastasia Moloney, ‘Terrorized at home’, Central America’s LGBT people to flee for their
lives: report, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-latam-lgbtrights/terrorized-at-home-central-americas-lgbt-people-to-flee-for-their-lives-report-idUS
KBN1DR28O (Central America is experiencing “epidemic levels of violence” and LGBT
people are “particularly vulnerable to macho, powerful gangs who control entire
neighborhoods,” and these crimes often go without punishment.).
123
Nelson Renteria, ‘Am I next?’: Killings in El Salvador leave transgender people in
fear, REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2017, 9:41 a.m.), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-el-salvadorlgbt-violence/am-i-next-killings-in-el-salvador-leave-transgender-people-in-fear-idUSKB
N16Z1QR.
124
The Violation of the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Persons in El
Salvador, ASSOCIACION SALVADORENA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS “ENTRE AMIGOS” ET AL.
(Oct. 2010), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngo/LGBT_Shadow_Report_
El_Salvador_HRC100.pdf.
125
See Davenport, supra note 115, at 14.
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Guatemala

Similar to the individuals escaping El Salvador, many LGBTI
individuals from Guatemala have been forced to leave their country “to
escape ‘epidemic levels of violence’ and threats by criminal gangs and
security forces . . . .” 126 However, unlike Mexico and El Salvador,
antidiscrimination laws do not apply to LGBTI individuals in Guatemala,
and very few efforts have been undertaken by the government to address
the discrimination LGBTI individuals face. 127 LGBTI individuals face
discrimination “in access to education, health care, employment, and
housing.” 128 The National Police and Public Ministry made changes to
their complaint registrations system to include a field that allowed them to
identify whether the complaint was made by a member of the LGBTI
community. 129 However, because many LGBTI individuals do not feel
“comfortable self-identifying to officials” (perhaps because of the abuse
they have faced by members of the police themselves) the success of the
program is not completely known. 130 Furthermore, women who identify
as lesbian experience a specific form of discrimination. 131 Often they are
forced into marriages that they do not want or are raped and forced to
become pregnant, known as “corrective rape.” 132

D.

Honduras

In Honduras, although the law protects LGBTI individuals from
discrimination, and also includes hate crimes in its penal code, many

See Moloney, supra note 122.
U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Guatemala 2016 Human
Rights Report, 27 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments
/2017/03/09/dos-hrr_2016_guatamala.pdf.
128
Id. at 27; see also Visibles, UN Launches Guatemala version of global LGBT
campaign, WASHINGTON BLADE (Nov. 24, 2017, 6:00 AM) http://www.washingtonblade.
com/2017/11/24/un-launches-guatemala-version-global-lgbt-campaign/ (quoting U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein who stated that “LGBTI
people are stigmatized, dehumanized even, by Guatemalan society and media, leaving
them particularly vulnerable to violence and ill-treatment. They face discrimination at all
levels, discrimination that prevents them from accessing education and justice, getting
decent jobs and receiving adequate health care.”).
129
Guatemala 2016 Human Rights Report, supra note 127.
130
Id. at 27.
131
Id.
132
Id.; see also Christine Bolanos, Guatemala’s First Lesbian Congresswoman
Challenges Status Quo, NEWS DEEPLY: WOMEN & GIRLS (May 29, 2017),
https://www.newsdeeply.com/womenandgirls/articles/2017/05/29/guatemalas-first-lesbi
an-congresswoman-challenges-status-quo.
126
127
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individuals are still victims of violence and discrimination. 133 “Since 2009
until December 1, 2014, there have been 174-recorded violent deaths of
LGBT people in the country (90 gays, 15 lesbians and 69 trans gender
people) . . . .” 134 Even with the National Congress adopting amendments
to the Criminal Code that are meant to protect LGBT individuals, these
laws are not enough to stop the violence towards those expressing a nonheterosexual identity or perceived as non-heterosexual. 135 In fact, “killings
of LGBT people or those perceived as such tend to go unpunished,”
because of the “discriminatory stereotypes;” 136 “of [the] 141 violent deaths
reported between 2010 and 2014, only 30 cases had been prosecuted, that
is, fewer than one fourth of the violent deaths of LGBT people.” 137 The
lack of punishment for those committing the murders can lead to
underdeterrence and thus further crimes being committed towards LGBTI
individuals.
The case Velasquez-Banegas v. Lynch documents the continual
persecution that LGBTQI individuals face in Honduras. 138 Writing for the
majority, Judge Posner states that the record did not support the denial of
withholding of removal. 139 “The petitioner, a citizen of Honduras, entered
the United States without authorization, after being put in removal
proceedings he applied for withholding of removal and for protection
under the CAT claiming that he would be persecuted if he was sent back
to Honduras. 140 Although he did not identify as a homosexual male, he
claimed that because of his HIV status he would be perceived as a gay
U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Honduras 2016 Human
Rights Report, at 34 (2016), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Honduras
-1.pdf.
134
Situation of Human Rights in Honduras, INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, at 59 (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Honduras-en2015.pdf.
135
Id. at 60 (stating the amendments to the Criminal Code include “(i) establishing the
commission of aggravating crimes due to ‘hatred or contempt by reason of [ . . . ][the]
sexual orientation or gender identity of the victim; (ii) sentence of imprisonment and find
in case of the arbitrary and illegal restriction or cancellation of the exercise of individual
and collective rights, or the denial of provision of professional services on the grounds of
sexual orientation and gender identity, among other reasons; and (iii) sentences of
imprisonment and fines in case of public incitement to hatred or discrimination by reason
of sexual orientation and gender identity, among other reasons.”).
136
Id. at 61.
137
Id. at 62.
138
Velasquez-Banegas v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 258, 259 (7th Cir. 2017).
139
Id. at 261 (stating that “immigration judge made a hash of the record. A highly
qualified American Ph.D. professor of Latin American studies, Suyapa Portillo, who
specializes in the LGBTQ community (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer—an
acronym that covers the entire spectrum of homosexual and related sexual orientations) in
Honduras, testified as an expert witness for the petitioner.”).
140
Id. at 259.
133
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male, and therefore would be a victim of persecution. 141 Using expert
testimony by Dr. Suyapa Portillo, the petitioner argued that if he were
deported, he would face “acute danger . . . resulting from the fact that a
great many Hondurans believed that AIDS is an affliction of
homosexuals . . . and also that any man with HIV is also a homosexual”
and because of this he would face the hostile violent treatment by
Hondurans towards anyone they believed to be a homosexual. 142
According to Dr. Portillo, “it’s very difficult for people with HIV to find
employment [because] employers often require proof that an applicant
does not have HIV.” 143
“She testified that since Honduras’s 2009 coup d’etat
(when the Honduran Army, following orders from the
Honduran Supreme Court to oust President Manuel
Zelaya, sent him into exile), more than 200 LGBTQ
people have been murdered according to a pattern she
thought indicated an ‘LGBT cleansing,’ in which
transgendered women were murdered with a single shot
to the head and homosexual men tied up and mutilated . . .
the police are complicit in the murders and that laws
purporting to protect LGBTQ people form assaults and
murders are rarely enforced.” 144
Although the petitioner was not a homosexual man himself, the court
held that because Hondurans perceive anyone with HIV to be homosexual
he “fits the description of Hondurans at risk of persecution because
believed (accurately or not) to be homosexual.” Because the petitioner is
not required to “hide characteristics like religion or sexual orientation, and
medical conditions, such as being HIV positive[,]” 145 the court remanded
the case for reconsideration. 146

E.

Peru

In Peru, LGBTQI individuals also face acts of violence,
discrimination, and other abuses. 147 According to the human rights report
Id. at 259-60.
Id. at 259.
143
Id. at 261.
144
Id. at 263-64
145
Id. at 262.
146
Id. at 264.
147
Ana Cristina Hernandez, Kellea Miller & Irene Schneeweis, Peru LGBTI: Landscape
Analysis of Political, Economic and Social Conditions, Astraea Lesbian Foundation for
Justice (2015), http://www.astraeafoundation.org/uploads/files/Reports/Astraea%20Peru
%20Landscape%202015.pdf.
141
142
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by the U.S. State Department, “LGBTI persons remained some of the most
marginalized individuals in the country and frequently were targets of
discrimination.” 148 The law does not protect LGBTQI Peruvians, and the
reality that they live is not quite understood because the state does not keep
national-level statistics of the discrimination faced by LGBTQI
individuals. 149 However, according to studies conducted by NGOs, about
95 percent of LGBTI Peruvians “experienced some type of violence or
discrimination directed at them because of their status as LGBTI
persons.” 150 In its 2015-2016 annual report on LGBT human rights in Peru,
Promsex, a feminist NGO, reported that between April 2015 and March of
2016, there were eight murders of LGBTI people reported. 151 Several of
them were stabbed repeatedly, beheaded, asphyxiated or punched or
kicked until death. 152 In one case, the victim was beaten to death, after
being subjected to acts of torture, and inhumane or degrading treatment. 153
However, although the number of murders is not representative of the
magnitude of violence against the LGBTI population, it serves to

U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Peru 2016 Human Rights
Report, at 25-26 (2016), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Peru-1.pdf.
149
Id. at 25; see also Peruvian lesbian wins asylum with help from law school students,
WIS. GAZETTE (May 18, 2012), http://www.wisconsingazette.com/news/peruvian-lesbianwins-asylum-with-help-from-law-school-students/article_c5581aed-ac7e-53b2-aa09-ec8a
524cec9d.html (“‘Karina’s experience as a lesbian in Peru, supported by friends and family
who still live there—as well as by reports and news articles—shows that the Peruvian
government does not protect LGBT individuals from sexual orientation—based crimes . . .
[l]esbians face both physical and sexual violence, and the Peruvian police fail to address
this persecution.”).
150
Peru 2016 Human Rights Report, supra note 148, at 26.
151
Liurka Otsuka, Karen Anaya, Alberto Hidalgo & Manuel Forno, Informe Annual
Sobre Derechos Humanos de Personas Trans, Lesbianas, Gays y Bisexualees en el Peru
2015-2016, (Promsex June 2016), 11, https://promsex.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/
InformeTLGB2015al2016-1.pdf (translated from Spanish).
152
Id. at 54.
153
Id. at 55; see also Peruvian Lesbians wins asylum with help from law school students,
WIS. GAZETTE (May 18, 2012), http://www.wisconsingazette.com/news/peruvian-lesbianwins-asylum-with-help-from-law-school-students/article_c5581aed-ac7e-53b2-aa09-ec8a
524cec9d.html (students at Columbia Law School’s Sexuality and Gender Law Clinic
helped a lesbian Peruvian secure asylum in 2012, because of her fear that she would be
persecuted in Peru because of her sexual orientation. As support they used the petitioner’s
experience as a lesbian in Peru, along with affidavits from friends and family, and reports
and news articles that showed that the Peruvian government does not protect LGBT
individuals from crimes against them because of their sexual orientation. The students also
used a study by Movimiento Homosexual de Lima, a Peruvian LGBT community
organization, that stated that “each week a person is killed in Peru due to sexual orientation
or gender identity.”); see also Mattia Cabitza, Peru gay rights activists push for more rights
in law, BBC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america16965382.
148
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demonstrate that homicides towards the LGBTI community are
particularly cruel. 154
For LGBTQI people in Peru, discrimination is part of their everyday
reality, and the police do nothing to protect them. 155 In fact, the police also
participate in the discrimination or violence against LGBTQI
individuals. 156 Over Valentine’s Day weekend in 2016, LGBTQI
individuals held a small demonstration, “Kisses Against Homophobia.” 157
A demonstrator was beaten by police while kissing his boyfriend, and
police also “forcibly broke up the crowd using batons and water
cannons.” 158 Because discrimination toward LGBTQI people is so
embedded in the culture it is hard to get support from presidential and other
political candidates, 159 who do not need the support of the LGBTQI

See Otsuka et al., supra note 151 (discussing the experiences of LGBTQ individuals
relating to torture and other cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment).
155
Brendan O’Boyle, Peru’s LGBT Community Frustrated by Violence, Presidential
Election, AM. Q. (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/perus-lgbtcommunity-seeks-voice-presidential-election.
156
Id.; see also Response to Information Requests (RIRs), IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE
BOARD OF CANADA (Mar. 3, 2005), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/
legacy/2013/11/07/PER43413.FE.pdf (stating in its section on police treatment of LGBTQ
people, “[o]n 18 June 2004, a gay and lesbian nightclub was raided by the Lima municipal
police, accompanied by cameras from major television networks. Raiz Diversidad
criticized the police for using violence and invading the privacy of those apprehended
during the raid. The police reportedly attacked and beat people who tried to avoid being
filmed on camera.”); see also Violence against LGBTI Persons, INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, at 78 (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.oas.org/
en/iachr/reports/pdfs/violencelgbtipersons.pdf (“In 2013, the IACHR was informed of the
case of Joel Molero, a 19 year-old Peruvian man who was brutally attacked and beheaded
[after leaving a gay club], with his genitals, fingers and toes mutilated. His body was then
put on a mattress and set on fire.”).
157
O’Boyle, supra note 155; see also Cabitza, supra note 154 (“On 12 February 2011,
the Peruvian police beat a group of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people who were
kissing in the capital’s main square to protest against discrimination.).
158
O’Boyle, supra note 155.
159
Id.; see also Peru: The situation of homosexual men and women, including protection
available to victims of ill treatment, CANADA: IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BOARD OF
CANADA, (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e438c7b2.html ( stating in an
article by Andean Air Mall & Peruvian Times, that in Peru, “homosexuality is ‘perceived
as inherently flawed and often as an illness.’” In another article by the Runa Institute for
Gender Development and Research they stated that “a person who displays ‘an abnormal
[sexual orientation] exposes him-or herself to dangerous situations and loss of social
consideration.). Yet another report by Peruvian Centre for Promoting and Defending
Sexual and Reproductive Rights and Peruvian Network of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and
Transgenders stated that “in 2008, acts of violence were committed by the Peruvian
National Police (Policia Nacional del Peru, PNP) and by members of various communities
in different regions of the country, which ‘demonstrates that discrimination and prejudice
against [] LGBTs are rooted in cultural practices.’”).
154
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community to win their elections when they have the support of the
majority of Peruvian who also oppose same-sex unions. 160

F.

The Philippines

LGBTQI people in the Philippines are victims of discrimination from
a very young age. 161 Although “[i]n recent years, lawmakers and school
administrators in the Philippines have recognized that bullying of LGBT
youth is a serious problem” these policies are not enough to protect LGBT
youth. 162 In Vitug v. Holder, the court held the BIA’s denial of withholding
of removal for a Filipino homosexual male “was not supported by
substantial evidence.” 163 Vitug knew that he was “different” since he was
about three years old. 164 He was “effeminate” and played with toys
socially acceptable for girls. 165 As a child in school, his classmates would
bully him for “being a sissy.” 166 During high school, he continued to
experience bullying “because of his perceived effeminate behavior and
homosexuality.” 167 The violence and discrimination he faced continued as
an adult. 168
The Immigration Judge found Vitug credible, and found that (1) he
had been “beaten and robbed five times in Manila after being targeted as
a homosexual,” and “[t]wo of these beatings were severe”; (2) “[w]hile
waiting for the bus in Manila, Vitug was harassed by police officers on
account of his perceived sexual orientation,” and they “threatened to arrest
Anastasia Moloney, Peru gay marriage bill ‘doomed’ this year-congressman,
REUTERS (May 17, 2019), http://news.trust.org/item/20190517151615-mz15t/ (I draw the
conclusion that political candidates do not need the LGBTQ community’s vote from the
fact that “[t]wo different polls in 2017 showed that at least seven in 10 Peruvians were
against same-sex unions.” When a majority opposes rights for the LGBT community, it is
easier for candidates to also oppose these rights, and not fear losing their elections.).
161
Philippines: LGBT Students Face Bullying, Abuse, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jne 22,
2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/21/philippines-lgbt-students-face-bullying-abu
se#.
162
“Just Let Us Be” Discrimination Against LGBT Students in the Philippines, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (June 21, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/06/21/just-let-usbe/discrimination-against-lgbt-students-philippines (“But these policies, while strong on
paper, have not been adequately enforced. In the absence of effective implementation and
monitoring, many LGBT youth continue to experience bullying and harassment in school.
The adverse treatment they experience from peers and teachers is compounded by
discriminatory policies that stigmatize and disadvantage LGBT students and the lack of
information and resources about LGBT issues available in schools.”).
163
Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013).
164
Id. at 1060.
165
Id.
166
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
167
Id.
168
Id.
160
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him for loitering if he did not give them money”; (3) he was “unable to
find a job in the Philippines on account of his sexual orientation”; 169 (4)
“[t]he police will not do anything to help gay men who report abuse but
will rather ridicule them and tell them they deserve it”; (5) “[t]he
government has failed or refused to protect gay men from persecution.” 170
Although Vitug had not reported the attacks to the police, he did “credibly
testify that it is well known in the Philippines that police harass gay men
and turn a blind eye to hate crimes committed against gay men.” 171 Along
with his testimony, he also presented “documentary evidence of a police
raid on a gay theater during which police beat and robbed the patrons.” 172
Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to grant the petitioner
withholding of removal especially since the government had not shown
“by a preponderance of the evidence that the circumstances within the
Philippines [had] changed such that Vitug no longer face[d] a threat to his
life or freedom in the Philippines.” 173
Vitug’s experience in the Philippines is only one of the multiple stories
of discrimination and violence LGBTQI people face. According to a report
by the United Nations Development Programme and USAID, although
there are signs of acceptance towards LGBT Filipinos, LGBT Filipinos are
still being murdered. 174 According to the report, 32 LGBT individuals
See Matter of T-Z, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 171 (Board of Immigration Appeals May 9,
2007) (“Generally [the] case law has described persecution as the infliction of suffering or
harm, under government sanction, upon persons who differ in a way regarded as offensive
(e.g., race, religion, political opinion, etc.), in a manner condemned by civilized
governments. The harm or suffering need not [only] be physical, but may take other forms,
such as the deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage or deprivation of liberty,
food, housing, employment or other essential of life.”).
170
Vitug, 723 F.3d at 1061.
171
Id. at 1065.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 1066.
174
United Nations Development Programme & United States Agency International
Development, Being LGBT in Asia: The Philippines Country Report, at 8 (2014),
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1861/2014%20UNDP-USAID%20
Philippines%20LGBT%20Country%20Report%20-%20FINAL.pdf; see also Dominique
Mosbergen, The Dangers of Being LGBT in ‘Tolerant’ Philippines, HUFFINGTON POST
(Oct. 12, 2015, 9:11 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/lgbt-philippines_
us_5614f92fe4b021e856d2d870 (“On the surface, the Philippines may appear to be one of
the more ‘liberal’ ASEAN countries when it comes to the LGBT community.
Homosexuality is not criminalized, and a handful of anti-discrimination ordinances . . .
[and in a] Pew Research Center report about global opinions of the LGBT community,
more than 70 percent of Filipinos said homosexuality should be ‘accepted by society,’
making the Philippines the most ‘tolerant’ nation surveyed in the Asia-Pacific region after
Australia. However, although ‘there is high tolerance here, there’s not acceptance,’ Ging
Cristobal . . . Legal recognition and protection of LGBT people at the national level largely
remains absent.”).
169

2020]

QUEERING THE DREAM

51

were murdered in 2011. 175 However, for transsexual individuals, the
experience is worse. 176 According to Transrespect versus Transphobia
Worldwide, between 2008 and 2015, there were 40 reported murders of
trans and gender diverse people. 177 These are only reported murders;
murders that are not reported by authorities or murders of individuals that
are not classified as trans or gender diverse are still missing. 178 It is
believed that the number is higher because many murders of transsexual
individuals go unreported. 179 Therefore, without accurate numbers the true
experience of trans people is unknown.

G.

Colombia

Colombia, like Mexico, has come a long way in making changes
through legislation and court orders to ensure protections for LGTQI
individuals. 180 According to the U.S. State Department human rights
175
Mosbergen, supra note 174; see also The Struggles of the LGBT Filipinos: A Look
into the Prejudice and Hate Crimes that LGBT Filipino Experience, THE PHILIPPINE LGBT
HATE CRIME WATCH (Nov. 29, 2011), https://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?cid=F5A5CCD
7C8A4C0EC&resid=F5A5CCD7C8A4C0EC%21162&app=WordPdf (last visited Jan. 8,
2018) (asserting, according to a chart used by this organization, there were a total of 144
LGBT individuals killed between 1996-2011 (98 were gay, 16 lesbian, 26 transgender, and
4 bisexual). However, it is important to remember that these numbers are not an accurate
representation of all the murders committed against LGBT individuals because of
underreporting.).
176
See Mosbergen, supra note 174 (“The Philippines has one of the worst records of
violence against the trans community.”).
177
2,016 reported deaths of trans and gender diverse persons murdered between January
2008 and December 2015, TRANSRESPECT VERSUS TRANSPHOBIA WORLDWIDE, http://
transrespect.org/en/map/legal-gender-recognition-change-of-name/ (last visited Nov. 10,
2019).
178
See Mosbergen, supra note 174.
179
Id.
180
See Colombian Civil Society Organizations Highlight LGBTQ Violence in New
Report, HUMAN RTS. CAMPAIGN: INTERNATIONAL BLOG (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.hrc.
org/blog/colombian-civil-society-organizations-highlight-lgbtq-violence-in-new-repor
(stating that Colombia has made significant progress, but that violence towards LGBTQ
Colombians is still a reality); see also Press Release, Org. of Am. States, IACHR Hails
Regional Progress on Human Rights of LGBTI People in the Americas (Mar. 10, 2017),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2017/028.asp (asserting that although
a lot of progress has been made in Latin American countries including Colombia to protect
LGBTQI human rights there is still violence and discrimination that occurs. This news
article states that “[d]espite all these steps forward, the Inter-American Commission
concurs with the concern expressed by various civil society organizations in the region
regarding the danger of losing ground in the recognition of the rights of LGBT people.
According to information the Commission has received, this situation is manifested in
disinformation campaigns about measures some States are taking in the area of LGBT
rights. Such campaigns further stigmatize LGBT people, encourage violence, intensify hate
speech, and hamper the implementation of certain measures already in States. The IACHR
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report, “there was no official discrimination based on sexual orientation in
employment, housing, statelessness, or access to education or health
care.” 181 Furthermore, Colombia’s Constitutional Court, in 2015, granted
same-sex couples the right to adopt children. 182 In April 2016, the court
also granted same-sex couples the right to marry. 183 However, the reality
faced by LGBTQI individuals is similar to other countries where LGBTQI
people face persecution, discrimination, and violence. 184 According to a
report done by civil society organizations in Colombia, homicides against
LGBTQ people increased in 2015. 185 In 2015, there were 110 LGBT
people murdered, which is the highest number of homicides against LGBT
people since 2012. 186
However, Colombian LGBTQI individuals are not only victims of
violence by private individuals, they are also the victims of police brutality
because of their LGBTQI identity.187 According to the same report by
Colombia Diversa, 91 LGBT people were victims of police brutality in

is concerned to observe situations in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru in which, according to
information it has received, there have been incidents involving attacks, the spread of hate
speech, and rejection of LGBT people by conservative sectors.”).
181
U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R., and Lab., Colombia 2016 Human
Rights Report, at 45 (last visited Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2019/01/Colombia-2.pdf.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.; see also Luz E. Nagle, Giving Shelter from the Storm: Colombians Fleeing
Persecution Based on Sexual Orientation, 48 TULSA L. REV. 1, 17 (2013) (“The reality for
Colombia’s LGBTs is that having laws enacted and court rulings rendered to extend rights
to them is far different than LGBTs being able to actually reap the benefits of those rights.”
Having laws on the books does not change the fact that LGBT individuals are still subject
to discrimination in their daily life. Colombians know that enforcement and redress for
discrimination based on sexual orientation is low, therefore they continue to engage in such
actions.).
185
See Colombian Civil Society Organizations Highlight LGBTQ Violence in New
Report, supra note 180; see also Excluded Bodies Faces of Impunity: Report Violence
Against LGBT People in Colombia, COLOMBIA DIVERSA (2015), http://colombiadiversa.
org/ddhh-lgbt/EN/.
186
Colombian Civil Society Organizations Highlight LGBTQ Violence in New Report,
supra note 180 (asserting that from 2012-2015 there were about 405 homicides against
LGBT people in Colombia, with Antioquia having the highest number, at 118 individuals.
Of the 110 individuals murdered, 52 were gay, 33 transgender, 11 lesbian, and 7 bisexual.).
187
See Nagle, supra note 184, at 20 (“In addition to family and community biases,
persecution by police officers against homosexuals in Colombia is a symptom of firmly
entrenched homophobia throughout law enforcement agencies nationwide. The proclivities
of Colombia’s ‘macho’ attitudes so pervade the police forces that fear and disdain for
homosexuals border on paranoia.” This widespread homophobia makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for homosexuals to report acts of violence committed towards them in fear that
they will be victims of even further abuse by the police.).
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2015. 188 Of these 91 cases of police brutality, 57 of them were against trans
people, and eight of them included sexual abuse of trans sex workers. 189
Other forms of violations against LGBT Colombians by police include:
“raids, arbitrary detentions, torture, sexual harassment, and expulsion from
public places,” and “threats and murders targeting people who denounce
these violations.” 190
Furthermore, LGBTQI Colombians have also been victims of
discrimination and violence because of the civil war. 191 Paramilitary
groups, which formed to fight the FARC (a Columbian guerrilla group),
have committed crimes against LGBTQI individuals. 192 In a small town,
San Onofre, in the state of Sucre, “gay men and transgender women were
forced to participate in a boxing competition as a form of public
humiliation.” 193 The idea “was to force these [individuals] to ‘bring out
their masculinity’ through the use of violence and physical domination—
traits traditionally associated with manhood.” 194 Additionally, the
militants also “distributed pamphlets that promised to cleanse the town

Id. (according to the report the main types of violence committed by police towards
LGBT individuals were personal injuries, selective application of the law (meaning “fines
to same sex couples, exclusion from public places of groups of LGBT people or
transgender women performing sexual work, detention of clients of transgender women”),
threats, arbitrary detention, oral aggression, alleged attempt of murder, and alleged
extrajudicial execution.).
189
Id.; see also Kate Lyons, The trans experience in Colombia: ‘This is where we workand this is where we are killed,’ THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.
theguardian.com/global-development/2017/oct/08/trans-women-in-colombia
(documenting the story of Daniela Maldonado Salamanca, a transsexual woman, who was
standing on the street in Bogota, Colombia, in 2010, when five men beat and stabbed her.
When the police arrived, they took her to the hospital, but they never investigated the crime,
even though the street she was standing on was a busy street, and there were witnesses.
However, Salamnaca does not think that the fact that there were witnesses would help her
since most of the witnesses were actually urging the attackers on. This article also discusses
how three quarters of all murders of trans people take place in South and Central America.
Due to the high level of “violence, poverty, and the risk of HIV the life expectancy of a
trans women in Latin America is estimated at between 35 and 41 years.” After Salamanca
was attacked she founded an organization, Red Comunitaria Trans, which helps record the
number of actual crimes committed against transsexual women, to try to counter the “scant
official statistics.” According to Red Comunitaria Trans there had been 12 murders of trans
women in the suburb of Santa Fe, Bogota from January till October 2017.).
190
See Monica Espitia, LGBT In Colombia: A War Within, CUNY ACAD. WORKS (Dec.
16, 2016), https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1156&context=gj
_etds.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
188
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from ‘undesired members of society,’ including drug addicts, criminals,
and members of the LGBT community[.]” 195
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”) also
participates in violence against LGBTQI individuals.196 They persecute
“male and female homosexuals ‘because they break social norms.’” 197
LGBT individuals are viewed as “sub-human degenerates that have no
place at the table of social and political liberation envisioned by their
Marxist-based revolutionary movement.” 198 The FARC justifies their
violence against LGBT individuals as a “legitimate weapon of war against
the government for having supported and legislated the recognition of
political and civil rights for Colombia’s gay and lesbian community.” 199
Like in many other countries the progress made in protecting LGBTQI
people’s rights is pushed back with violence, and often the crimes go
without punishment because the systems put in place to protect them are
“mired in red tape, corruption, [and] lingering homophobic bias[.]” 200
Courts and legislatures can pass laws, but they cannot eliminate the
homophobic culture that has been around for decades, sometimes even
centuries. And Colombia society continues to be homophobic, in fact,
“[t]he majority of Colombia society refers to LGBTs in pejorative and
crude terms, and there is no attempt to contain such bigotry or show
discretion.” 201

H.

Dominican Republic

Although same-sex sexual activity is not criminalized in the
Dominican Republic like in other Caribbean countries, LGBTQI
individuals are victims of violence and discrimination because of their
195

Id.
Id.; see also Nagle, supra note 184, at 21.
197
See Nagle, supra note 184, at 21 (explaining that often times the FARC participates
in “social cleansing,” but for them it is only retaliation against the government for having
passed laws that give recognition to the political and civil rights of Colombian LGBT
citizens.); see also Thomas Graham, Colombia’s ‘social cleansing’ phenomenon:
Exterminating people like bugs, COLOMBIA REPORTS (Apr. 21, 2016), https://colombia
reports.com/social-extermination-undesirables-colombia/ (“Legal authorities continue to
turn a blind eye to so-called ‘social cleansing’ practices that kill hundreds of ‘undesirables’
in Colombia’s urban areas every year. Social cleansing killings have a long, bloody history
in Colombia’s major cities. For the most part they remain unsolved, yet to human rights
monitors they are part of a vicious crusade against society’s ‘disposables,’ targeting
vagrants, criminals, prostitutes, drug addicts, homosexuals and anyone deemed
undesirable.”).
198
Nagle, supra note 184, at 21.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 17.
201
Id. at 19.
196
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sexual orientation or gender identity. 202 LGBTQI Dominicans face
discrimination in their everyday life, including in the areas of housing,
employment, education, and healthcare. 203 In fact, many LGBT
individuals, especially transgender individuals, do not seek medical care
because they have experienced, or heard about the experience of other
LGBT members, “ridicule and stigmatization by healthcare professionals
and administrative staff.” 204 This is also true about LGBT member’s
interactions with the police. 205 Many LGBTQI individuals do not report
crimes committed against them because they do not trust the police or
justice system. 206 This distrust in the police is because “[m]embers of the
police force have been responsible for arbitrary arrests of LGBT
Dominicans and violence and extortion of those in custody.” 207

202
LGBT Issues in the Dominican Republic, HUMAN RTS. FIRST, http://www.
humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/dominican-republic-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Jan.
11, 2018); see also U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R., and Lab., Jamaica
2016 Human Rights Report, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265810.pdf
(stating that Jamaica, a country in the Caribbean, continues to have laws in the books that
forbid “‘acts of gross indecency’ between persons of the same sex, in public or in private,
and provides a penalty of two years in prison for the offense.” The country also has
“‘antibuggery’ laws that criminalizes consensual and nonconsensual anal intercourse,
punishable by up to 10 years in prison.” However, according to the report no one was
prosecuted under this law, except in cases of sexual assault and child molestation.).
203
See Hope Will Prevail: Advancing the Human Rights of LGBT People in the
Dominican Republic, HUMAN RTS. FIRST (Dec. 2015), http://www.humanrightsfirst.
org/sites/default/files/HRFReportLGBTinDR.pdf (“According to a 2014 poll, 73 percent
of Dominican citizens believe there is discrimination against LGBT people.”).
204
Id. at 1; see also Colectiva Mujer y Salud et al., Violations of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights of Person with Diverse Sexual Orientations and Gender Identities in the
Dominican Republic, at 2 (Aug. 2016), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CESCR/
Shared%20Documents/DOM/INT_CESCR_CSS_DOM_25002_E.pdf (“The Dominican
Republic has failed to meet its obligations with respect to the right to health. Persons with
diverse sexual orientations and gender identities face discrimination in obtaining equal
access to health care services []. More broadly, they are denied respect for their sexual
orientation and gender identity and are confronted with pervasive violence and
discrimination.”).
205
Id.
206
Colectiva Mujer y Salud, supra note 204.
207
Hope Will Prevail: Advancing the Human Rights of LGBT People in the Dominican
Republic, supra note 203, at 7-8 (explaining that a clear example of police targeting LGBT
individuals was evidenced when two gay men were arrested for kissing in public even
though the law does not criminalize such actions. When the local prosecutor intervened the
men were released. In October 2015, transgender women in Santiago also denounced the
persecution by local police. Prostitution in the country is not illegal, however, transgender
sex workers are arrested, beaten, and extorted.); see also Janet Arelis Quezada,
Transgender woman files claim against police in Dominican Republic, GLAAD (Oct. 21,
2014), https://www.glaad.org/blog/transgender-woman-files-claim-against-police-domini
can-republic (explaining that transgender woman was beaten and arrested after refusing to
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Furthermore, the homophobia felt by LGBTQI individuals is not only
due to violence by individual police officers, but a function of homophobia
being embedded in the law. 208 The law “prohibits police officers from
engaging in sodomy.” 209 Those who violate the law can be punished with
up to two years in prison. 210 The effect of the law is the prohibition of
LGBT people from serving in the police force. 211 “In 2014, National Police
Chief Manuel Castro affirmed this interpretation, stating that the law
prohibits LGBT people from becoming members of the police force.” 212
Those LGBTQI individuals who do decide to serve on the National Police
Force must do so without expressing their sexual orientation, and often
“live in fear of abuse, harassment, humiliation and removal from the
force.” 213

IV.

FORMS OF RELIEF AVAILABLE

If the court injunctions are not upheld, many DACA recipients will
begin to lose their status, revert back to their prior undocumented status,
and be at risk for deportation. 214 Those that never applied out of fear or for
give the police officers money. According to reports they beat her until she was left
unconscious.).
208
LGBT Issues in the Dominican Republic, supra note 202.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.; see also Colectiva Mujer y Salud, supra note 204, at 8.
213
Colectiva Mujer y Salud, supra note 204, at 8.
214
See Patrick Taurel, Screening Potential DACA Requestors for other forms of Relief,
AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.
org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/screening_potential_daca_requestors_for_other_f
orms_of_relief.pdf (reaffirming, as stated earlier in this note the Trump administration on
September 5, 2017, decided to end the DACA program. The administration did not end the
program immediately instead they decided to phase it out. As of September 5, 2017, no
new applications would be accepted. Anyone who currently had DACA would be allowed
to keep their status until the expiration of their Employment Authorization Document
(EAD). Anyone with an EAD that expired before March 5, 2018, would be allowed to
renew their status, as long as they submitted their applications by October 5, 2017.
However, anyone with an EAD that expired after March 5, 2018 would not be allowed to
renew their status, and they would simply go back to “whatever unauthorized status they
possessed at the time they acquired DACA.”); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cali. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (stating that on
October 17, 2017, U.S. District Court Judge William Alsup issued a ruling blocking the
Trump administration’s attempt to end DACA. In his ruling, he ordered the Department of
Homeland Security to reinstall the program on a “nationwide basis on the same terms and
conditions as were in effect before the recession on September 5, 2017. Although this case
is important, this case note will not take it into consideration. I will proceed as if DACA is
ending, because it is still the Trump’s administration position to end the program as
evidenced by his remarks made after the ninth circuit issued the ruling and the
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lack of funds and are unable to do so now due to no new applications being
processed, continue to live in fear of being sent back to their home
countries. Sending LGBTQI youth back to countries where violence and
discrimination is the daily experience for people who openly identify as
LGBTQI or are perceived as LGBTQI is like sending them to exile.
Although there are forms of relief such as asylum, withholding,
Convention Against Torture, cancellation of removal for non-legal
permanent residents, adjustment of status through family-sponsorship, Uvisas, and T-visas, LGBTQI DACA recipients will have difficulties that
their heterosexual counterparts will not face. In this section, I analyze the
different forms of relief now available for those who lose their status and
are then put into deportation proceedings. In each section, I also analyze
how LGBGQI DACA recipients will have a harder time attaining these
forms of relief and the overall difficulties that all DACA recipients have.

A.

Asylum 215

A person who fears returning to his country might be eligible to apply
for asylum. 216 To attain asylum, a person must demonstrate that they meet
the definition of a refugee. 217 To establish that they are a refugee, a person
administrations attempts to have the Supreme Court rule that the program is
unconstitutional.).
215
Withholding and the CAT are also forms of available relief for anyone with a fear of
being persecuted if returned to their home country. Because most of the same struggles
exist that are illustrated in the asylum section I will only highlight the minor differences.
The standard for withholding is much higher than for asylum. To qualify for withholding
“an alien must prove it is more likely than not that he will be persecuted if returned to the
country of removal. See Salkeld v. Gonzales, 420 F. 3d 804, 809 (8th Cir. 2005). This
requires proof that there is “more than a 50 percent chance you will be persecuted.” See
Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and Convention Against Torture, U. OF MIAMI SCH. OF
L. IMMIGRATION CLINIC, http://media.law.miami.edu/clinics/pdf/2013/immigrationAsylum-Withholding-Removal-CA.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2018). Another major
difference is that under withholding there is not a one-year deadline. To qualify for the
CAT, and applicant must prove that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be
tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” See Reyes-Reyes, 384 F. 3d at
787 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)). Under the CAT the torture has to be at the hands of
the government or with the “consent or acquiescence” of the government, or that the
government had “actual knowledge, or willful acceptance” or were “willful[ly] blind[ed].”
Reyes-Reyes, 384 F. 3d at 787 (quoting Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F. 3d 1186, 1194-95 (9th
Cir. 2003)). Because of the higher burden of proof necessary for these two forms of relief,
seeking an experienced lawyer is even more essential. However, the financial burden is
once more a problem.
216
Ilona Bray, Asylum or Refugee Status: Who is Eligible?, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/asylum-or-refugee-status-who-32298.html (last
visited Nov. 10, 2019).
217
Asylum in the United States, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (May 14, 2018),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/asylum-united-states.
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must show that they are “unable or unwilling to return to [their] country
of nationality either because: (1) [they were] persecuted in the past; or (2)
[they have] a well-founded fear of future persecution ‘on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.’” 218

i. Particular Social Group
Most gay and lesbian individuals would seem to fit in the particular
social group class of protected people. In Hernandez-Montiel, the court
discusses how sexual orientation and sexual identity are a basis for
establishing the particular social group (“PSG”) requirement. 219 Although
the definition of “PSG” is not entirely consistent in the circuits, sexual
orientation has been accepted as the basis for establishing a particular
social group. 220 In 1990, the B.I.A., in In re Toboso-Alfonso, affirmed an
immigration judge’s decision holding that sexual orientation can be the
basis for establishing a PSG for asylum purposes. 221 In 1994, then
Attorney General Janet Reno issued an order mandating that the
immigration system adopt Toboso-Alfonso as precedent “in all

Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2000); see also INA
§ 101(a)(42)(A); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987).
219
Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093.
220
Connor Cory, The LGBTQ Asylum Seeker: Particular Social Groups and Authentic
Queer Identities, GEO. J. GENDER & L. XX, 584-587.
221
See Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec,. 819, 820-23, (B.I.A. 1990); see also
Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1094; see also Asylum Law Basics: A Brief History,
IMMIGRATION EQUALITY, https://www.immigrationequality.org/get-legal-help/our-legalresources/immigration-equality-asylum-manual/asylum-law-basics-a-briefhistory/#.XcjB42xYaZs (last visited Nov. 10, 2019) (stating that “[t]his case was pivitoal
in establishing that a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of one’s sexual
orientation is a valid basis on which to claim asylum status in the United States”); see also
David Johnston, Ruling Backs Homosexuals on Asylum, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/17/us/ruling-backs-homosexuals-on-asylum.html; see
also Robert C. Leitner, A Flawed System Exposed: The Immigration Adjudicatory System
and Asylum for Sexual Minorities, 58 U.MIAMI.L.REV. 679, 686 (2004), available at
https://repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&
httpsredir=1&article=1419&context=umlr (stating that before 1990 homosexuals were
“categorically barred from entering the United States. In fact, Congress made its intent to
bar homosexuals from entering by adding “‘sexual deviation’ to the exclusion grounds in
1965.” Then in 1990 when Congress enacted the Immigration Act of 1990 it removed the
bar on homosexuals. That same year the BIA affirmed an IJ’s decision that held that Cuban
gays was a particular social group. Later in 1993, another immigration judge also granted
asylum to a homosexual man from Brazil. Both these cases allowed homosexuality to serve
as the basis for establishing membership in a particular social group that was subject to
persecution.).
218
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proceedings involving the same issue or issues.” 222 This opened the door
for gay men and lesbians to apply for asylum based on their claim on their
particular social group—a sexual minority.223 But even though the
designation of Toboso-Alfonso as precedent established that sexual
minorities were a PSG, all LGBTQI asylum seekers still have to prove that
they belong to this particular social group or protected class—a sexual
minority. 224
As stated earlier, there is no one definition of what a “PSG” is. In fact,
there are three definitions. The first, which the First Circuit has adopted, 225
comes from the B.I.A. decision of Matter of Acosta, which held that a PSG
was composed of persons who share a “common, immutable
characteristic” that is either “innate” or arises form “shared past
experience.” 226 The common characteristic must be one that members
“cannot change” or is so “fundamental to their individual identities or
consciences” that they should not be required to change it. 227 Under this
understanding of PSG, the implication is that sexuality “cannot change, or
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their
individual identities or consciousness.” 228 However, not everyone agrees
that sexuality is an immutable characteristic. In fact, sexual fluidity seems
Att’y Gen. Ord. No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994).
See Zsea Bowmani, Queer Refuge: The Impacts of Homoantagonismi and Racism in
U.S. Asylum Law, 18 GEO.J.GENDER & L. 1, 4 fn. 14 (2017) (explaining that although
transgender individuals have been granted asylum there is still no precedent decision that
establishes that a transgender identity is its own particular social group.); see HernandezMontiel, 225 F.3d at 1088 (showing that although this decision is often hailed as a victory
for LGBTQI individuals, it is also troubling because it shows how the attorney’s had to use
a homosexual identity for the respondent in order to fit the framework in Matter of TobosoAlfonso (homosexual man being granted asylum and establishing homosexuality as a
particular social group). However, the respondent seems to be a transsexual female, but
instead is referred to as a “gay man with female sexual identities.” The court failed to
address whether a transgender identity constituted a particular social group, in fact there is
no actual precedent established by the BIA that a transgender identity meets the PSG
requirement.”); see also Victoria Neilson & Aaron Morris, The Gay Bar: The Effect of the
One-Year Filing Deadline on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and HIV-Positive
Foreign Nationals Seeking Asylum or Withholding of Removal, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 233,
240 (2005) (referring to Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, a case where the court also made its
decision using a “‘gay man with ‘deep female identity,’” although the applicant was a male
to female transgender person from El Salvador).
224
See Reagan Greenberg, Comment, The “Particular Social Group” Requirement: How
the asylum process is consistently failing LGB applicants and how an evidentiary standard
of “self-attestation” can remedy these failures, 17 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER
AND CLASS 147, 148-149 (2017).
225
See Ananeh-Firempong v. I.N.S., 766 F. 2d. 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985).
226
Matter of Acosta, 191 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
227
Id. at 233-34.
228
Id.
222
223
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to be on the rise, and more and more people are refusing to accept labels
for their sexuality. 229
The Ninth Circuit has articulated another definition of a PSG. 230 Under
the Ninth Circuit’s definition, “a social group consisted of a group united
by a common interest and that the associational relationship must be
voluntary and possess a common characteristic that is fundamental to the
shared identity.” 231 The court’s definition in Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS,
instead of adopting an immutable characteristic, “insists that a voluntary
association exists(implying that the members of the group are aware of
their association) and requires “that the group not be overbroad.” 232
In Gomez v. INS, the Second Circuit gave yet another definition for
PSG. 233 In that case, the court held that the “social group was defined as
‘individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic in common
which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a Persecutor—or in the
eyes of the outside world in general.’” 234 Under this test, although “the
attributes of a particular social group must be recognizable and discrete[,]”
it was more in the view of the actual persecutor rather than the “alien’s
own self-identification with the group.” 235 Although this decision is
important because it seems to allow an asylum claim for those who do not
identify as homosexuals, but still participate in what we recognize as
“homosexual activities” or even as “perceived homosexuality,” it is not a
complete victory for LGBT individuals. 236 The decision creates a test
“based on how the persecutor perceives them, not on whether they have
sexual relations with men or women or neither or both.” 237 This is
troubling because the persecutor has to perceive them as homosexual or
know about the person committing homosexual acts. Because there is no
real “characteristic that is readily observable” to identify a person as
LGBTQI and because many people continue to try to fit in and hide any
sexual attractions or actions with same-sex partners, the persecutor would

229
See Explainer: What is Sexual Fluidity?, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 23, 2015, 7:51
AM), http://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-sexual-fluidity-33120; see also Jenell
Williams Paris, The End of Sexual Identity: Why Sex is Too Important to Define Who We
Are, INTERVARSITYPRESS, at 73 (2011).
230
See KAREN MOULDING & NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND
TRANSGENDER COMMITTEE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, at 844 (2017-2018 ed.
2017) (citing Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 766 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986)).
231
Id.
232
MOULDING ET. AL., supra note 230.
233
Id.
234
Id. (citing Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2nd Cir. 1991).
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.

2020]

QUEERING THE DREAM

61

not always identify a person as LGBTQI, and this has led immigration
judges to determine that individuals would not face persecution. 238
Although it seems that one would just be able to go into immigration
court and state that they identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,
queer, or intersex, that is not the case. A respondent bears the burden of
proof in establishing that they belong to a particular social group, 239 and
because there is no real unifying characteristic for LGBTQI individuals,
proving one’s identity is often more difficult than it seems. LGBTQI
individuals “often do not outwardly show traits or knowledge that comport
with an IJ’s perception of the protected class” and this sometimes leads to
“inappropriate questions” from an immigration judge, 240 and further
exacerbates the stereotypes that people have of LGBTQI individuals—that
gay men are more feminine, and lesbians are masculine women. This is
troubling because it leaves out those who are not “obviously” gay or
lesbian according to the stereotypes that the judge or asylum officer has,
and it also leaves out bisexuals. 241
In Ali v. Mukasey, the immigration judge denied relief under the CAT
to a gay Guyanese man. 242 The gay man’s CAT claim was based on his
status as a criminal deportee and homosexual. 243 The IJ stated that “violent
dangerous criminals and feminine contemptible homosexuals are not
usually considered to be the same people[.]” 244 Furthermore the
immigration judge also stated that “the picture of [Ali] as a proud,
professed homosexual in Guyana seems to be more an expression of
wishful thinking than something that’s particularly likely to come true.” 245

238

Id.
Asylum Basics: Elements of Asylum Law, IMMIGRATION EQUALITY, https://www.
immigrationequality.org/get-legal-help/our-legal-resources/immigration-equality-asylummanual/asylum-basics-elements-of-asylum-law/#.XcjG1NpKhhE (last visited Nov. 10,
2019).
240
See Topel, supra note 8, at 2369.
241
See Greenberg, supra note 224, at 161; see also Apphia Kumar, “I was the first
bisexual person granted asylum in the U.S.,” a first-person account for #BiWeek, GLAAD
(Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.glaad.org/blog/i-was-first-bisexual-person-granted-asylumus-first-person-account-biweek (explaining that bisexual individuals are often denied
asylum because of the “false assumption that adjudicators and judges make:” that “a
bisexual person can choose to be with someone of the opposite gender and pass as [a
heterosexual person] and be safe in their home country.”).
242
Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F. 3d 478,479 (2d Cir. 2008) (although CAT is not the same as
asylum, immigration judges are the same adjudicators of asylum claims and this case shows
the biases that immigration judges hold).
243
Id. at 480.
244
Id. at 487, 491.
245
Id. at 487.
239
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Although the Second Circuit remanded the case because of the IJ’s bias, it
noted that the “agency may well reach the same decision on remand.” 246
In yet another case, Razkane v. Holder, the circuit court also remanded
the decision because of the gay stereotypes that the IJ used.247 The IJ relied
“on his own views of the appearance, dress, and affect of a homosexual”
to conclude that Razkane “would not be identified as a homosexual.” 248
Even though these cases have been remanded, they are still proof that some
immigration judges hold stereotypes of what it means to be LGBTQI. If a
person does not follow these stereotypes, the judge can find that they lack
credibility, or that they will not be perceived as such in their countries and
therefore not face persecution.
Another key case that demonstrates how sexual identity is not always
recognized by the courts is the case of Kimumwe v. Gonzalez. 249 In this
case, the Eighth Circuit denied asylum to a “gay Zimbabwean man who
feared persecution because of his sexual orientation.” 250 Zimbabwe
criminalized homosexuality, making it “punishable by imprisonment and
a substantial fine.” 251 However, the court did not take into account
“Kimumwe’s self-identification [] as a gay man.” 252 Instead, the court
focused on the fact that he would be punished for sexual conduct with
another male, and not the fact that he was a homosexual. 253 The IJ stated
that Kimumwe’s “problems with the authorities in Zimbabwe ‘were not
based simply on his sexual orientation, but instead resulted [from] his
engaging in prohibited sexual conduct.” 254 Both the IJ and the Eighth
Circuit decided to focus on the sexual conduct, rather than on the
homosexual identity as the reason for the criminalization. 255

ii. One-year deadline
The one-year deadline presents an additional obstacle for LGBTQ
individuals applying for asylum. In 1996, Congress made changes to the

Id. at 493.
Razkane v. Holder, 562 F.3d 1283 (10th Cir. 2009); see also MOULDING ET. AL., supra
note 230.
248
Razkane, 562 F.3d at 1288; see also Shahinaj v. Gonzales, 481 F. 3d 1027, 1029 (8th
Cir. 2007) (remanding the case based on the fact that the IJ discredited Shahinaj’s claim of
persecution due to homosexual orientation base on “personal and improper opinion [that]
Shahinaj did not dress or speak like or exhibit the mannerisms of a homosexual”).
249
See Kimumwe v. Gonzalez, 431 F.3d 319, 320 (8th Cir. 2006).
250
Bowmani, supra note 223, at 23; see also Kimumwe, 431 F.3d at 323.
251
See Bowmani, supra note 223, at 23.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Id.
246
247
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INA that changed asylum law by imposing a one-year deadline. 256 To be
eligible for asylum, a foreign national had to submit their application
within one year of entering the United States. 257 However, Congress did
leave some exceptions to the deadline. The INA allows for individuals
who missed the deadline to still apply if they can demonstrate “changed
circumstances” or “extraordinary circumstances” related to the case. 258
Because most DACA recipients have been here for years (to be eligible
for DACA, one of the requirements was that you continuously resided in
the U.S. for at least five years before June 5, 2012, and that you were
present in the U.S. on June 5, 2012) the one-year filing deadline will make
it difficult for them to apply for asylum. 259
Although there is no case law that addresses whether the fact that a
person is no longer eligible for DACA constitutes an extraordinary
circumstance or changed condition, one could argue by analogy. If a
person is lawfully present in the U.S., and then loses their status and
applies within a reasonable period after losing their status the regulation
seems to allow for the person to file under the “extraordinary
circumstance.” 260 However, because DACA status might not be
considered lawful status, it might not work. 261 “Another common
exception, is ‘legal disability,’ which includes being a minor.” 262 In Matter
of Y-C-, the BIA reiterated the asylum regulation that being an
unaccompanied minor would qualify as an “extraordinary
circumstance.” 263 However, this would mean that you either apply before
you turn eighteen, or within a “reasonable time” after you turned
eighteen. 264 And according to a Pew Research Center survey only about

Victoria Neilson & Reena Arya, Practice Advisory: Overcoming the One-Year Filing
Deadline for Asylum for DACA Recipients, CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC.
(2018), https://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/DACA-and-the-One-Year-Filing-Deadlin
e-.pdf.
257
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2000).
258
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (2000).
259
Jason Dzubow, Asylum for DACA Recipients and Dreamers, THE ASYLUMIST (Dec.
1, 2016), http://www.asylumist.com/2016/12/01/asylum-for-daca-recipients-and-dreamer
s/.
260
8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(iv) (2009).
261
Id. (reading, “[t]he applicant maintained Temporary Protected Status, lawful
immigrant or nonimmigrant status, or was given parole, until a reasonable period before
the filing of the asylum application[.]” This does not mention DACA, so the argument
would have to be made by analogy.).
262
Dzubow, supra note 259.
263
In re Y-C-, 23 I. & N. Dec., 286 (B.I.A. 2002).
264
See Dzubow, supra note 259.
256

64

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:2

29 percent of DACA recipients are between the ages of 16 and 20, 265 and
this percentage is even less for LGBTQI identified individuals.
Under the changed circumstance exception, “these changes can be in
the conditions of an applicant’s country of origin (e.g., an outbreak of
violence or change of regime), in the applicant’s circumstances (e.g. . . .
coming out as gay . . . ).” 266 However, even though coming out as LGBTQ
counts as a changed circumstance exception, there are still requirements
for the use of the exception because an applicant has to file the application
within a “reasonable period [of time]” in light of the particular
circumstances at issue. 267 Because many LGBTQ youth decided to comeout during the time that they had DACA they might have difficulty proving
that they are filing their application within a “reasonable period [of
time].” 268 However, some of the youth could possibly argue that they came
out because they had DACA and therefore felt safe being out, and now
that the situation has changed they now have an actual fear of returning. It
is still recommended that youth submit their applications within six
months of losing DACA status if possible or even sooner.269 However, it
is quite likely that asylum adjudicators or immigration judges will deny
the applications because the applications were not filed in a “reasonable
time” after the youth came out as LGBTQ. 270

iii. Country Conditions Improving
Another hurdle that LGBTQI individuals have to face is the fact that
the government, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is
presenting evidence of positive changes in conditions in the countries
listed above to rebut the fear of persecution. 271 DHS is using the fact that
some of these countries have now passed same-sex marriage and antidiscrimination laws as proof that LGBTQI individuals will not face
Gustavo Lopez & Jens Manuel Krogstad, Key facts about unauthorized immigrants
enrolled in DACA, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/09/25/key-facts-about-unauthorized-immigrants-enrolled-in-daca/.
266
See Immigration Relief for DACA Recipients Based on Fear of Return, CTR. FOR
GENDER & REFUGEE STUD. (Feb. 2018), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default
/files/CGRS%20DACA%20Fear%20of%20Return%20Claims%20Practice%20Advisory
_02-28-2018.pdf.
267
8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(ii), (a)(5) (2005).
268
Id.
269
DACA: Frequently Asked Questions, BERKELEY, https://undocu.berkeley.edu/dacafrequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
270
Id.
271
Isn’t It Safe Now? How to Reconcile Official Tolerance and an Emerging LGBT
Nightlife with your Client’s Fear or Returning Home, ABA (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/international_law/publications/international_law_ne
ws/2014/fall/isnt_it_safe_now_how_reconcile_official_tolerance/.
265
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persecution anymore. 272 With the recent decision by the Inter-American
Court urging countries to pass same-sex marriage, 273 DHS will have more
evidence to show that the conditions are improving. However, what DHS
fails to take into consideration are different reports by NGOs showing that
the conditions are sometimes made worse when countries pass progressive
LGBTQI laws—there is a backlash against the passage of these laws. 274
In Neri-Garcia v. Holder, the court upheld the BIA’s denial of a
Mexican citizen’s applications for restriction of removal and for relief
under the CAT. 275 The court held that evidence that the BIA based its
conclusion about “fundamental changes in Mexico with respect to the
treatment of homosexuals” was enough to prove that conditions in Mexico
had improved, and that the level of “inhospitable attitude, even
discrimination” that Neri-Garcia would face were “insufficient to establish
a threat to Neri-Garcia’s life or freedom if he returned to Mexico.” 276
Even if a DACA recipient claims past persecution, such as sexual
abuse by a family member, which in turn establishes a presumptive
entitlement of future persecution, the government could argue age as a
272

Id.
See Enrique Andres Pretel, Latin American human rights court urges same-sex
marriage legalization, REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2018, 7:58 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-latinamerica-lgbt/latin-american-human-rights-court-urges-same-sex-marriagelegalization-idUSKBN1EZ020; see also Opinion Consultiva OC-24/17, Identidad de
genero, e igaldad y no discriminacion a parajas del mismo sexo, CORTE INTERAMERICANA
DE DERECHOS HUMANOS (Nov. 24, 2017), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/
seriea_24_esp.pdf.
274
Marillia Brocchetto, The perplexing narrative about being gay in Latin America, CNN
(Mar. 3, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/26/americas/lgbt-rights-in-the-americas
/index.html (“Latin America offers a contradictory narrative: The region has the highest
rates of violence against the LGBT community, according to research done by Transgender
Europe, a non-governmental organization, but it also has some of the most progressive
laws for LGBT equality and protection . . . Lutz argues that while more LGBT people have
been coming out of the closet in Chile, some of the violence is a backlash to society’s
increasing acceptance of the LGBT community.”).
275
Neri-Garcia v. Holder, 696 F.3d 1003, 1006 (10th Cir. 2012); see also David W.
Austin, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 47 YEAR IN REV. (ABA) 469 (2013), (“[I]n
Neri-Garcia v. Holder, the Tenth Circuit considered whether Mexico’s treatment of gay
men had sufficiently improved to justify returning a victim of past persecution. The court
was impressed by the ‘mostly positive developments’ outlined in the U.S. State Department
Human Rights Report (notably Mexico City’s legalization of gay marriage and adoption
by gay couples and a Mexican Supreme Court decision requiring recognition of valid samesex marriages in states that had yet to legalize them) and concluded that petitioner could
be removed. In light of the murder of several Mexican LGBT activists in recent years, some
have argued that the case sets dangerous precedent by fostering an undue reliance on
representations by the State Department that ‘everything is cool.’”).
276
Neri-Garcia, 696 F.3d at 1009 (citing Ba v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d 1265, 1270 (10th Cir.
2008) (stating “discrimination . . . , as morally reprehensible as it may be, does not
ordinarily amount to persecution”)).
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changed circumstance to rebut the fear of future persecution. In IxtlilcoMorales v. Keiser, the Eighth Circuit upheld the BIA’s use of age
progression as a “fundamental change in circumstances that rebutted
Morales’ fear of future persecution.” 277 Morales argued that the reading of
the “term ‘fundamental change in circumstances’” only referred to
“changes in country conditions, not changes in an applicant’s personal
circumstances.” 278 However, the court upheld the broader interpretation
and stated that “[w]hile it is certainly true that changed country conditions
may constitute a fundamental change in circumstances . . . we have found
no law suggesting that country conditions are the exclusive type of
‘circumstances’ envisioned by the regulation.’” 279 Therefore, it upheld that
the BIA’s determination “that as an adult, Morales would not be subject to
the persecution that he suffered in the past: significant harm inflicted by
his family members.” 280 Furthermore, the court also upheld the BIA’s
conclusion that the attacks on homosexuals and those with HIV in Mexico
“have not been so numerous or so widespread as to support a claim that
the respondent has a well-founded fear of persecution.” 281

iv. Financial Hurdles
For many LGBTQ youth eligible for asylum, financial hurdles get in
the way of actually seeking relief under asylum. Because of the
complications that arise in making a legal asylum claim, it is advisable that
LGBTQI DACA recipients seeking to apply for asylum attain an
experienced attorney to help them out with the merits of the case.
However, the cost of legal representation is yet another roadblock for
many DACA recipients. According to a report by Migration Policy
Institute, more than one-third (35 percent) of eligible DACA youth in
2013, lived in families with incomes below 100 percent of the federal
poverty level, and two-thirds of the youth lived in families with incomes
below 200 percent of the federal poverty level. 282 For many, finding the
Ixtllilco-Morales v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 651, 654 (8th Cir. 2007).
Id.
279
Id.
280
Id. at 655.
281
Id. at 653-56 (citing Salkeld v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 804, 809 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding
that evidence of police harassment of homosexuals and “alarming instances of violence
towards homosexuals” in Peru, did not compel a finding that alien demonstrated a clear
probability of persecution if returned to Peru; noting that Peru does not have laws
prohibiting homosexuality or requiring homosexuals to “register themselves”)).
282
Jana Kasperkevic, The high cost of being a legal immigrant in the US: $465, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2014, 20:01), https://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/jan/08/
undocumented-dreamers-immigration-daca-cost-fee; see also Jeanne Batalova et al.,
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals at the One-year Mark, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.
(Aug. 2013), file:///Users/candelariosaldana/Downloads/DACA2013-FINAL%20(1).pdf.
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cost of the application, $495, was a big enough barrier. 283 Trying to find
enough to pay a lawyer will contribute to the obstacles already in place
within the immigration system. For LGBTQ youth, it becomes even more
difficult because many of them, “as many as 25%,” are disinherited by
their parents. 284 “Ask[ing] Mom or Dad [, or other family members,] for
help—especially if they’re told to ‘get out’” is almost impossible. 285 As
mentioned later in this note, LGBTQ youth are disproportionately more
likely than their heterosexual counterparts to end up homeless due to
family unacceptance, 286 which also contributes to the financial hurdles
LGBTQ youth face.

B.

Cancellation of Removal for Non-Permanent Residents

Although some LGBTQ Dreamers will meet the requirements for
cancellation of removal for non-permanent residents, many will not
because they are disconnected to their family and because the law itself
has a heteronormative requirement for eligibility. In 1996, the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA)
replaced suspension of deportation with cancellation of removal and
adjustment of status for certain nonpermanent residents, or often referred
to as the “10-year cancellation of removal.” 287 To be eligible for non-LPR
cancellation of removal a noncitizen must meet certain elements: (1) they
“[have] been physically present in the United States for a continuous
period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the issuance of the
See Noah Lanard, Rhode Island’s Dreamers No Longer Have to Shoulder $500 in
DACA Renewal Fees, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 18, 2017, 5:41 PM), http://www.
motherjones.com/politics/2017/09/rhode-islands-dreamers-no-longer-have-to-shoulder500-in-daca-renewal-fees-1/ (Rhode Island worked with individual donors and
organizations to help with the financial obstacle of applying to renew DACA. Governor
Raimondo stated, “We’re not going to allow $495 to stand in the way of our neighbors’
dreams.” Other cities and organizations also followed suit, in San Francisco, the Mission
Asset Fund also announced it would provide $1 million to help about 2,000 dreamers renew
their permits. This was acknowledgment that money continues to stand in the way for
DACA recipients.).
284
Joseph Gentile, Disowned LGBT Students Need Financial Aid Help, HUFFINGTON
POST (Apr. 4, 2012), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/tngg/lgbt-students-financial-aid_
b_1246762.html.
285
Id.
286
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Transexual, Queer, Questioning and TwoSpirit (LGBTQ2S), HOMELESS HUB, https://www.homelesshub.ca/about-homelessness
/population-specific/lesbian-gay-bisexual-transgender-transsexual-queer (last visited Nov.
10, 2019).
287
Maria Baldini-Potermin, IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK, §6:30, (Thomas West,
2019); see also Building Your Case from the Ground Up: A Guide to 10-year Cancellation
of Removal, FLORENCE IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE RTS. PROJECT, http://firrp.org/media/10Year-Cancellation-Guide-2013.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
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notice to appear”; (2) they “[have] been a person of good moral character”
during the 10-year period immediately preceding the date of the
application for relief; (3) they have not been convicted of an offense under
INA §212(a)(2) [8 U.S.C.A. §1182(a)(2)] (criminal and related grounds),
INA § 237(a)(2) [8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)] (criminal offenses), or INA
§ 237(a)(3) [8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(3)] (failure to register or falsification of
documents); (4) the removal of the noncitizen “would result in exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship to the [] spouse, parent, or child[(ren)]”
who is a U.S. citizen or an LPR; and (5) he “merits a favorable exercise of
discretion.” 288

i. 10-year Presence and good moral character
Any DACA recipient put into removal proceedings, served with an
NTA, after June 15, 2017, would meet the first requirement, 10-year
presence in the United States, because one of the requirements for DACA
is that the person “has continuously resided in the United States for at least
five years preceding the date of [the June 15, 2012] memorandum.” 289
Most would also meet the good moral character requirement as well
because it is a requirement that they are “currently in school, has graduated
from high school, has obtained a general education, . . . or is an honorable
discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United
States” and that they not be “convicted of a felony offense, a significant
misdemeanor offense, multiple misdemeanor offenses, or otherwise poses
a threat to national security or public safety.” 290
However, there are some crimes that LGBTQI youth are more
susceptible to due to the fact that they are also more likely to become
homeless. According to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, on average there were about 549,928 people experiencing
homelessness on any given night in 2016. 291 Of the total number of
homeless individuals, over one-fifth are children, and about nine percent
are individuals between the ages of 18 and 24. 292 Although the report does
not account for lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals, it does take into
consideration transgender individuals. 293 According to the report, there are
about 1,770 transgender homeless individuals in a night; 0.6 percent of

INA § 240A(b)(1); 8 USC § 1229b(b)(1).
Napolitano, supra note 20.
290
Id.
291
Meghan Henry et al., The 2016 Annual Homeless Assessment Report (AHAR) to
Congress, THE U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV. (2016), 1, https://www.
hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2016-AHAR-Part-1.pdf.
292
Id. at 1.
293
See generally id.
288
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which were living in unsheltered locations. 294 Further research by the
National Alliance to End Homelessness puts the number of
unaccompanied youth and young adults up to the age of 24 that experience
homelessness in a year at 550,000. 295 About 40 percent, or 220,000, of
these individuals, identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or
questioning (LGBTQ). 296
“When [they are] left out on the streets without shelter, many youths
will resort to the criminal activities of prostitution and drug dealing in
order to survive.” 297 “Studies focused in New York City consistently
report that homeless youth often trade sex for a place to stay each night
because of the absence of available shelter beds.” 298 Also, due to the
“homophobic and transphobic harassment, discrimination, and physical
violence within the child welfare and foster care systems and emergency
short-and long-term shelters” LGBTQ youth are about “three times more
likely than young women to have traded sex for a place to stay, and
LGBTQ youth were seven times more likely than heterosexual youth to
have done so.” 299 Many of these youth would not have traded sex for
shelter if “they had alternative options for shelter.” 300 Most of the youth
involved in sex trade became involved because of the need to survive and
obtain “basic necessities such as food and shelter.” 301 Often times,
Id. at 9.
Youth and Young Adults, NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, https://
endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/who-experiences-homelessness/youth/
(last visited Nov. 30, 2017).
296
Jeffrey Poirier & Christian Rummell, Review of the LGBTQ Youth Homelessness
Prevention Initiative Planning Phase, THE U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV. (2016),
https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/Review-of-LGBTQ-YouthHomelessness-Prevention-Initiative.pdf; see also Carl Siciliano, Three LGBT Youths
Describe Being Homeless in NYC, ADVOCATE (Dec. 21, 2015, 6:02 AM), https://www.
advocate.com/commentary/2015/12/21/three-lgbt-youths-describe-being-homeless-nyc
(stating that “[t]here are at least 200,000 LGBT youths suffering homelessness in our
nation”).
297
Homeless LGBT Youth in New York City, THE ALI FORNEY CTR.,
https://www.aliforneycenter.org/_aliforney/assets/File/Youth%20Crisis%20Stats.pdf (last
visited Dec. 1, 2017); see also Victoria Bekiempis, Why are Homeless LGBTQ Youth
Trading Sex for Shelter?, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 25, 2015, 3:49 PM), http://www.
newsweek.com/lgbt-survival-sex-gay-lesbian-transgender-309123 (explaining a study
done in 2013, in New York City, a city that in 2015 had about 75,323 homeless people (or
about 16 percent of the U.S. homeless population), found that about 25 percent of the
homeless youth had traded sex for shelter.).
298
Meredith Dank, Surviving the Streets of New York: Experiences of LGBTQ Youth,
YMSM, and YWSW Engaged in Survival Sex, URBAN INST. (Feb. 2015),
https://www.urban.org/research/publication/surviving-streets-new-york-experiences-lgbtq
-youth-ymsm-and-ywsw-engaged-survival-sex/view/full_report.
299
Id. at 5-6.
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Id. at 19.
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LGBTQ youth are charged as sex offenders, even if they did not commit
a sexual crime. 302 This leads to LGBTQ youth having to register as “sex
offenders in 29 states if convicted,” and this can have dire consequences
later in life because of the stigma associated with being a registered sex
offender. 303 These criminal records can also have possible consequences
when applying for cancellation of removal of non-LPRs. 304

ii. You have a parent, spouse, or child who is an LPR or U.S.
citizen and your deportation will cause them an “exceptional
and extremely unusual” hardship
Even if a LGBTQI DACA recipient has no prior criminal record and
is able to prove good moral character, LGBTQI youth will have a harder
time than heterosexual DACA recipients with the requirement of showing
that a U.S. citizen or LPR parent, spouse, or child will suffer an
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. One could almost eliminate
a citizen and LPR parent, as the majority of the DACA recipient parents
are also undocumented.305 And even if they are legal permanent residents
or citizens, they might not actually be around or willing to support the
DACA recipient after they decided to come out as LGBTQI. 306 As
evidenced in the country conditions section above, the majority of DACA
recipients come from countries where homophobia is prevalent. For many,
their parents grew up embracing this homophobic culture, which leads to
rejection, physical and mental abuse, and often times to kicking the youth
out of the home. A study conducted by the Human Rights Campaign and
The League of United Latin American Citizens found that about forty
percent of Latino LGBTQ youth did not have family acceptance, and
“slightly less than half of LGBT Latino youth have an adult in their family
Jerome Hunt & Aisha Moodie-Mills, The Unfair Criminalization of Gay and
Transgender Youth, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 29, 2012), https://cdn.americanprogress
.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/06/pdf/juvenile_justice.pdf.
303
Id.
304
See generally §N.10 Sex Offenses, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR. (Mar. 2014),
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/10_sex_offenses_2014_final.pdf.
305
Zenen Jaimes Perez, A Portrait of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Recipients:
Challenges and Opportunities Three-Years Later, UNITED WE DREAM (2015),
https://unitedwedream.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/DACA-report-final-1.pdf
(asserting that about 3.5 percent of DACA recipients had a U.S. citizen parent, 10.6 percent
had a lawful permanent resident, and 77.9 percent had undocumented parents.).
306
Why do parents reject their LGBTQ children, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 3, 2017, 12:45
PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/why-do-parents-reject-their-lgbtq-children_
us_58b9a3f7e4b0fa65b844b26d (“One in twelve people who were out to the family they
grew up with got kicked out of the home . . . In one study, 40% of homeless youth identified
as LGBT. The #1 reason for homelessness among LGBT youth is that they ran away
because of family rejection. The #2 reason is that they were thrown out for being LGBT.”).
302
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they can turn to, if worried or sad, while 8 in 10 of their non-LGBT Latino
peers have such an adult.” 307
Furthermore, the majority of DACA recipients are unmarried.308
According to a Pew Research Center study, about 83 percent of DACA
recipients are unmarried, and 15 percent are married. 309 Following the fact
that only about four to five percent of DACA recipients are LGBT
identified, this would mean that less than one percent of DACA LGBTQI
youth are married, and unfortunately it is unknown if these are married to
another DACA recipient, U.S. Citizen, legal permanent resident, or an
undocumented spouse. 310 If they were married to a U.S. Citizen or LPR
they would have likely already applied for adjustment of status as others
have done. 311 Furthermore, another report by the Pew Research Center
shows that about “16 [percent] of LGBT adults [] are currently married,
compared with about half the adults in the general public.” 312 Together this
means that less than about 0.096 percent of LGBTQI DACA recipients are
married, making it unlikely that LGBTQI DACA recipients would have a
citizen or LPR spouse that would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship.
The last option would entail having an LPR or U.S. citizen child. 313
Although homosexuals do have children, the percentage is small. 314
According to a research done by the Williams Institute, about 28.7 percent
of LGBT people were raising children, 315 compared to a Gallup poll that

Id.; See Supporting and Caring for Our Latino LGBT Youth, HUMAN RTS. CAMPAIGN
& THE LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AM. CITIZENS (2018), https://lulac.org/assets/pdfs/LGBTLatinoYouthReport.pdf.
308
See Lopez & Krogstad, Key facts about unauthorized immigrants enrolled in DACA,
PEW RESEARCH (SEPT. 25, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/25/keyfacts-about-unauthorized-immigrants-enrolled-in-daca/.
309
Id.
310
Id.; see also Kerith Conron & Taylor N.T. Brown, LGBT DREAMers and Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), THE WILLIAMS INST. (Feb. 2017), https://willi
amsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-DREAMers-and-DACA-February2017.pdf.
311
See Kate Linthicum, Another thing Trump stripped from ‘Dreamers’: A loophole that
helped 40,000 of them get green cards, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017, 3:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-daca-mexico-20170907-story.html.
312
A Survey of LGBT Americans, PEW RES. CTR. (June 13, 2013), http://www.
pewsocialtrends.org/2013/06/13/a-survey-of-lgbt-americans/.
313
Perez, supra note 305, at 9 (showing that of the people surveyed about 24.9 percent
had a U.S. citizen child.).
314
Same-Sex Couple and LGBT Demographic Data Interactive, THE WILLIAM INST. &
UCLA SCH. OF L. (May 2016), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/visualization/lgbtstats/?topic=LGBT#about-the-data.
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showed that, in 2013, seventy-four percent of adults had children. 316
However, this number might not be directly correlated to LGBTQI DACA
recipients, as the study takes into account people from ages 18 to 65-plus,
and “[n]o DACA recipients are older than 36 because the program required
applicants to have entered the U.S. before their 16th birthday and have
been under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012.” 317 So, the number of
LGBTQI DACA recipients with children is probably significantly less
especially if one takes into consideration that millennials are also having
less children. 318
Even if an LGBTQI DACA recipient does have a child, the burden of
hardship is a hard one to meet. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),
in In re Francisco Javier Monreal-Aguinaga, held that although
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” was a higher burden to meet
than “extreme hardship,” the hardship did not have to rise to the level of
“unconscionable.” 319 The BIA also stated that “[i]n establishing eligibility
for cancellation of removal, only hardship to qualifying relatives, not to
the applicant himself or herself, may be considered, and hardship factors
relating to the applicant may be considered only insofar as they might
affect the hardship to a qualifying relative.” 320 The court found that the
level of hardship demonstrated by the respondent did not meet the standard
of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” because although the
children would have to relocate to Mexico the father was in “good health
and able to work,” that there was “nothing to show that he would be unable
to work and support his United States citizen children in Mexico.” 321
Although the Board recognized that the “respondent’s children will suffer
some hardship and likely will have fewer opportunities, should they go to
Mexico” it was not enough to establish that they would “suffer hardship
that is substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally
be expected from the deportation of an alien with close family members
here.” 322
Frank Newport & Joy Wilke, Desire for Children Still Norm in U.S., GALLUP (Sept.
25, 2013), http://news.gallup.com/poll/164618/desire-children-norm.aspx (this poll does
not take into consideration sexual orientation, various other data puts the LGBT population
anywhere between 3.8 percent and seven percent. However, if one subtracts 28.7 percent
from 74 percent it is equivalent to about 45.3 percent of heterosexual adult individuals
having children, which is about 36 percent higher than LGBT identified individuals.)
317
Lopez & Krogstad, supra note 308.
318
Ariana Eunjung Cha, We’re having fewer babies. Could that kill the economy?,
WASH. POST (June 30, 2017, 2:27 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/national/article158997969.html.
319
23 I. & N. Dec., 56, 60 (B.I.A. 2001).
320
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321
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322
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In another case, In re Martha Andazola-Rivas, the BIA also found that
the respondent had not established “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” to her U.S. citizen children. 323 The BIA reasoned that because
the respondent owned a home, two vehicles, and had $7,000 in savings
“the respondent and her children would not be penniless upon her return
to Mexico.” 324 Further, the BIA stated that although the educational
opportunities were not the same for the children as they would be in the
United States, “the respondent ha[d] not shown that the children will be
deprived of all schooling or of an opportunity to obtain an education.” 325
But most importantly, the BIA stated that the hardships that the respondent
“ha[d] outlined are simply not substantially different from those that
would normally be expected upon removal to a less developed county.” 326
Therefore, although not impossible to meet, the hardship must be
exceptional and extremely unusual and it must be to the LPR or citizen
spouse, child, or parent. Some reasons why a family member might suffer
are that “someone in the family is very, very sick and depends on you to
pay the medical bills,” “someone in the family has to stay in the United
States to receive medical treatment and couldn’t come back to your
country with you,” or “your kids have special needs or disabilities that they
receive help for in school or at the doctor, and that help isn’t available in
your country.” 327 Although an LGBTQI individual could use the
discrimination that they will experience in their home country for their
claim, this discrimination has to then be shown to create a hardship for the
U.S. citizen as well.

C.

Family Petitions

Only certain DACA recipients can obtain legal permanent resident
status within the United States. DACA recipients “who entered the country
illegally cannot easily get lawful status, even if they have a family member
who can sponsor them for permeant residence.” 328 Having entered the
country without inspection makes the DACA recipient inadmissible.329
23 I. & N. Dec., 319 (B.I.A. 2002).
Id. at 324.
325
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326
Id.
327
Baldini-Potermin, supra note 287.
328
Lena Graber & Jose Mgana-Salgado, DACA, Advance Parole, and Family Petitions,
IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. (2016), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resou
rces/prac_adv-daca_advance_parole_fam_pet-20160531.pdf.
329
Entry Without Inspection (EWI) and Family Unity Waiver in a Nutshell, NAT’L
IMMIGRATION FORUM (April 6, 2012), https://immigrationforum.org/article/entry-withoutinspection-ewi-family-unity-waiver-nutshell/; see also Keith Southam, Will Having Had
DACA Make It Easier for Me to Get a Marriage-Based Green Card?, NOLO,
323
324
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However, under the program, DACA recipients were allowed to travel
abroad with permission from the government to depart and return, known
as advance parole. 330 When the person reentered, or were paroled into the
U.S., it was considered a lawful entry. 331 This further allowed a person to
be considered for adjustment of status.
To apply for advance parole, a person has to pay a filing fee of $575. 332
As discussed earlier, many individuals did not take advantage of advance
parole because of the cost of filing the form and also the cost of travel.
Those that did apply, however, had to show that they were traveling abroad
for either “humanitarian purposes [(]including travel to obtain medical
treatment, attending funeral services for a family member, or visiting an
ailing relative[)]; educational purposes (such as semester-abroad programs
and academic research[)], or employment purposes [(]such as overseas
assignments, interviews, conferences or training, or meetings with clients
oversees[)].” 333 Although advance parole “authorizes the reentry into the
U.S. [it] does not guarantee that its holder will be paroled into the United
States upon [] return.” 334 What it does is it gives “an immigration official
[authority to] make a discretionary decision as to whether she will be
paroled into the United States.” 335
But, as discussed in the section on cancellation of removal, over 83
percent of DACA recipients are single. 336 Once more, the only option
seems to be if they have a U.S. citizen child. 337 Although there are “about
200,000 children who are U.S. citizens who have parents that receive
DACA protections,” 338 these children are unlikely to be of the age of 21,
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330
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Injunction, USCIS (July 17, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/deferred-actionchildhood-arrivals-response-january-2018-preliminary-injunction (“USCIS will not accept
or approve advance parole requests from DACA recipients.”).
331
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HOT AIR (Sept. 7, 2017), https://hotair.com/headlines/archives/2017/09/200000-kids-loseparents-dreamers-deported/.

2020]

QUEERING THE DREAM

75

the age required to sponsor a parent. 339 Many were also unaware of the
possibility of advance parole, had financial difficulties in applying and
executing an advance parole, and LGBTQ+ individuals feared returning
to their home countries because of the prevalent homophobia and
transphobia present there. Therefore, many DACA recipients continue to
be ineligible for adjustment because of their entry without inspection.
Further, the fact that advance parole is no longer available for DACA
recipients means that many DACA recipients will not be able to adjust
their status unless they leave the country therefore triggering the three or
ten-year bar. 340
LGBTQI individuals who did apply for advance parole and did not
adjust their status through a relative petition, and later decide to apply for
asylum, might also have complicated their case even further. In affect, it
allows the government to make a claim that they visited their country of
origin on advance parole and they were not persecuted. In Boer-Sedano v.
Gonzales, the IJ concluded that Boer-Sedano’s trips back to Mexico
“rebutted the presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution.” 341
Although the Ninth Circuit found that there was still sufficient evidence to
find that Boer-Sedano would face persecution, the court did reference its
precedent. “According to [the court’s] precedent, return trips can be
considered as one factor, among others, that rebut this presumption.” 342
The precedent the court referenced was Belayneh v. INS, where it
determined that the presumption of persecution “was rebutted when the
applicant made three return trips, there had been two favorable changes in
government, fifteen years had passed between the past persecution and the
asylum request, and there was no nexus between the spouse’s persecution
and the applicant’s fear.” 343 However, even though the court used other
factors, as evidenced in the asylum section, the government could use
changed country conditions, changed personal circumstances and also the
fact that a LGBTQI DACA recipient traveled to their home country and
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USCIS (Oct. 2013), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/A1en.pdf;
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340
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IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/
research/three-and-ten-year-bars; see also 8 U.S.C.S. 1182(a)(9)(B) (2019).
341
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did not experience persecution as evidence to rebut the possibility of
persecution. 344

V.

CONCLUSION

LGBTQI DACA recipients face unique challenges compared to their
heterosexual counterparts. If sent back to their home countries, there is a
high probability that they will be victims of persecution, discrimination,
and violence on account of their LGBTQI identity. In seeking alternative
remedies, they face immigration judges and adjudicators that hold
stereotypes and personal beliefs on what an LGBTQI individual looks like
and acts like, and if they do not meet these stereotypes, they face an asylum
petition denial. 345 Because immigration laws are based on heteronormative
policies and practices, and on the idea of a heteronormative family, the
laws in place often fail the LGBTQI community.
Although there are other forms of relief that are not analyzed in this
note, such as VAWA, U-Visa, and T-Visa, LGBTQI DACA recipients
often face other hurdles in attaining these. 346 For example, although
domestic violence is highly prevalent in same-sex relationships, often the
abusive partner “exert[s] ‘heterosexist control’ over the victim by
threatening to ‘out’ the victim to friends, family, or employer or
threatening to make reports to authorities that would jeopardize child
custody, immigration, or legal status.” 347 Even though LGBTQI
individuals overall have better experiences living in the United States, they
are still victims of homophobia and discrimination here. A clear example
is seen in the fact that “[l]esbian victims seldom report violent incidents to
the police because many fear prejudicial treatment.” 348 Also, as discussed
above, LGBTQI homeless youth often fail to report sexual trafficking
because they “fear that they will be mistreated or not believed because of

344
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their gender identity or sexual orientation.” 349 In fact, “[s]tudies have
found that LGBTQ youth are overrepresented in detention for prostitutionrelated offenses and report higher levels of police misconduct than their
straight peers.” 350
Trump’s decision to end DACA will have an impact on young
immigrant dreamers: individuals that have made their lives here in the
United States, and call America home. Some of these individuals have
never returned to their native countries or have only done so recently
through advance parole for a brief period of time. For many, being sent to
their native countries will mean leaving loved ones, the end of a career,
and living in poverty. For LGBTQI individuals, it means possible exile, or
discrimination to a level they have not experienced before. No one should
be required to hide their sexual orientation or gender identity. However, if
sent back to their home countries many LGBTQI individuals will have to
return to the “closet” in order to survive. But this form of survival is even
questionable due to the dire psychological consequences of hiding one’s
identity.
Although the courts have recently become involved and have issued
favorable decisions that require the U.S. government to reinstate DACA,
it is quite likely that the government will appeal these decisions,
continuing to leave many in limbo. 351 It is also highly probable that the
Supreme Court will eventually rule that Trump can rescind the program as
it is part of the executive’s “sovereign power.” 352 “Fortunately for Trump,
the law on immigration and related matters favors the president. Legal
precedents have traditionally accorded the chief executive complete and
nearly unchecked power to deny foreigners permission to enter the United
States.” 353 At the time of the final edit of this note, these topics are still
relevant; and should continue to be relevant because DACA is not an
actual permanent solution to one’s undocumented status, only Congress
Sex Trafficking and LGBTQ Youth, POLARIS PROJECT, https://polarisproject.org/
sites/default/files/LGBTQ-Sex-Trafficking.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
350
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the current cases litigating the DACA issue).
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353
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9c-401e-9019-188d21244b91 (last visited Aug. 10, 2019) (“‘The exclusion of aliens is a
fundamental act of sovereignty . . . inherent in the executive power,’ the Supreme Court
said in 1950. And lest there be doubt, Congress adopted a provision in 1952 saying the
president ‘may by proclamation and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend
the entry of all aliens and any class of aliens as immigrants or non-immigrants’ whenever
he thinks it ‘would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.’”).
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can grant a way to legal residency or a path to citizenship. Therefore,
LGBT youth are still at risk of being sent back to situations where
discrimination, violence and threats are part of everyday life.

